I joined the Nepali Army on 19 Chaitra 2038. At that time, the country was under a Panchayat system of government. At that time, the country did not face any serious security challenges. However, around 2042, leader Ramraja Prasad Singh detonated a bomb in Singha Durbar. At that time, I was working as a second lieutenant. The incident created a huge panic across the country, because such a large-scale explosion had not occurred before.

After the restoration of the multi-party system, political parties seemed skeptical about the role of the army. Especially, the psychological effect (hangover) caused by the 2017 incident still seemed to persist. Due to that, political parties tried to keep the army away from various security structures of the state. Its effect was clearly seen in mechanisms such as the District Security Committee and the Central Security Committee. Before the Panchayat system, the Nepali Army used to be an active member of those committees, but after the multi-party system, the army was removed from that role. After that, only the Nepal Police and the National Investigation Department remained as such members.

However, the National Security Council was established by making provisions in the 2047 BS constitution. It was formed with the aim of determining the overall security policy of the country and giving necessary instructions on control and mobilization of the army. However, the government did not show interest in forming the secretariat required for its effective operation for a long time. Although there was a plan to clarify the working style, structure and scope of the council by establishing the secretariat, it could not be implemented. As a result, the National Security Council could not play the expected effective role.

Later, in 2058 BS, the Secretariat of the National Security Council was established only after the then rebel Maoists launched a major attack on Dang. Earlier, it was the practice of having representatives of the Nepali Army in Indian pension camps and even in mountaineering teams when survey teams went to the border. However, after the multi-party system, the army was gradually separated from such roles. This indicated that the then government did not have full confidence in the army. However, over time, the relationship between the army and the political leadership seems to have gradually improved.

When Krishna Prasad Bhattarai became the Prime Minister, the Nepali Army also expanded numerically. At that time, the number of soldiers was gradually increased from about 35,000 to about 45,000, which indicated that the state had begun to give importance to the role of the army again.

When talking about the role of the Nepali Army, we talk about 'primary' and 'secondary' responsibilities. The primary responsibility is the defense of the country, facing external security challenges. Secondly, the army has played an important role in everything from natural disasters to the security of national parks. Since then, the army has also been deployed in the protection of telecommunications infrastructure.

The army has also been deployed in elections and has been showing an impartial role. After the Maoist armed conflict began in 2052 BS, the debate on mobilizing the army also began. At that time, the then Chief of Army Staff Dharmapalawar Singh Thapa had proposed the purchase of a helicopter for army mobilization. His proposal was that if there was a helicopter, it would be easier to mobilize.

However, at that time, the government was not ready to invest even Rs 400 million. The army was still seen as the king's army rather than the nation's army, so the state did not want to invest in the army. To what extent did Girija Prasad Koirala, when he was the Prime Minister, not listen to the army briefing during his visit to Surkhet? He went directly to the DIG office of the police and took the briefing.

In other words, the country should have been united to solve that problem, but there was a lack of confidence in mobilizing the army. Then it was decided that the police would take the operation forward and operations such as 'Kilo Sera 2' were launched. Later, the army was tried to be mobilized only after the Dunai and Holeri incidents. At that time, there was no situation where the army could be mobilized without the decision of the National Security Council. There was also a matter of balance between the king and the party, so that decision could not be made. That is why the army sent the army to Holeri to conduct a 'flag march' without the council's decision. Later, the Prime Minister also resigned over this incident.

At that time, it was not clear how much of the authority to mobilize the army belonged to the Prime Minister? How much belonged to the king? There was difficulty in mobilizing the army. Later, the army was mobilized only after the Maoists attacked the barracks. We call it military-civilian relations, and I think that if that had been good or if the government, army and king had made a decision by consensus and if the views on the Maoists were not different, it would have been better for the country.

But the army was mobilized in a reactionary manner. While the government-Maoist talks were going on, the Maoists were saying that they would not attack the army, when the rebels attacked them. Armed rebellion was a challenge for the country, a challenge for the state. However, the lack of uniformity in looking at it was a problem. Later, various difficulties arose, and after Magh 19, a different situation emerged.

After the Maoists joined the peace process, there was initially a distance in the relationship with the army. The war had just broken out, and the rebel forces had both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. That created an uneasy situation. However, gradually, as one or two elections were held, even the Maoist leaders developed a good relationship with the army. After the promulgation of the constitution in 2072 BS, military-civilian relations have become even stronger. The army also played a role in making the elections after 2062/63 peaceful and fair. That also helped instill confidence.

In particular, the rescue operations carried out by the army after the earthquake on 12 Baisakh 2072 BS further won the trust of the citizens. When military teams from countries including India, America, and Britain came to Kathmandu for rescue operations, the Nepali Army played a very good role in managing it. The Army played a good role in deploying foreign soldiers to the 14 earthquake-affected districts. At that time, I was also the chief of the 1st Battalion, which also covers Kathmandu.

After that, the parties' view of the Army also changed. It is heard that some security personnel supported so-and-so in the elections. However, the Army has never been accused of taking such a side.

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Looking at the role of the Army in the Gen-G movement of 23 and 24 Bhadau, I cannot claim that everything was 100% correct and complete because that incident was very short-lived and very sensitive. But from the beginning, I have considered the decision of the Army not to open fire or shoot at the people in Singha Durbar to be correct. This is my personal view. Because there is a world-wide difference between police firing and army firing in the course of maintaining internal security or law and order from an international perspective.

For example, if the army had done the same thing as the shooting that killed 19 people in Baneshwor, human rights activists around the world would have reacted very aggressively. There would have been great pressure even from powerful countries. But the situation would be different if the police had done it, because maintaining internal security is their primary responsibility and they have limited types of weapons.

But if the army had done the same thing, the situation would have been much more serious. The incident on the 23rd was the reason for the incident on the 24th. My understanding is that if the army had fired on the 24th like on the 23rd, violence would have repeated on the 25th and 26th and beyond, the country would have been more unstable, and the possibility of external intervention would have increased. However, some argue that the army should have used force to protect the physical infrastructure at all costs. I do not call that view completely wrong. There is also an argument that it would have been better to use force to some extent. But looking at the situation that day, it did not seem possible without using excessive force.

But the decision not to shoot had been made since the morning of that day. At that time, KP Oli was the Prime Minister. According to an interview I recently heard with a Gen-G leader, when I called the Valley Police Commander, current IGP and then Valley Police Chief Dan Bahadur Karki, after receiving information that the Parliament building was likely to burn, the police said, "We will not shoot today, yesterday's incident has caused us a lot of pain." Therefore, looking back now, it seems that all the security forces may have decided not to shoot according to that policy.

Everyone may have their own views on whether this decision was right or wrong. But it was important to prevent a massacre. Since the army did not shoot, people had stopped taking to the streets by trusting the army and obeying the curfew order from the night of the 24th. If the army had also fired, I believe the people would have lost their trust and the movement against the army could have escalated.

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The biggest way to enhance the international image of Nepal and the Nepali Army is through its presence in the UN peacekeeping mission. The professionalism of the army has increased significantly in the last 10-15 years. Before the Maoist conflict, the army had not experienced war on such a large scale. But through the peacekeeping mission, it gained real experience of war and had the opportunity to learn a lot by cooperating with the armies of other countries.

Since the UN is a democratic organization, the army was able to experience the importance of human rights, democracy and civilian security firsthand. For example, in Lebanon, we carried the UN flag to the fields to provide security to local farmers. Such experience has further helped the army understand the importance of human rights and civilian security. The Nepali Army has also played an effective role in enforcement operations under Chapter Seven of the UN. The Nepali Army has a better experience in operations such as controlling rebel camps than other South Asian countries. The experience of internal conflict has also increased the army's capacity and confidence.

The Army Act 2063, enacted by the parliament, is currently in force. The army is now working within the framework of the constitution, acts and regulations. Army-related officers are present and answerable in parliamentary committees. This is an example of democratic control and accountability. Democratization does not mean selecting military officials through elections, but working under the constitution and law.