The latest results from Bihar have once again made Indian politics look like a 'one-horse race'. The Narendra Modi-led NDA, which had a weak showing in the previous Lok Sabha elections, has made a stunning comeback in the 2025 Bihar Assembly elections by winning 202 out of 243 seats.

Gaurav Bhandari

BJP alone won 89 seats and formed an almost unchallenged majority with its coalition partners. The grand alliance including the Rashtriya Janata Dal and the Congress is clearly defeated. Bihar is one of the poorest but most important states in India in terms of population and number of Lok Sabha seats, so the elections here are often considered a ‘test case’ of ‘national mood’.

This victory is not limited to state power alone, it is a sign that the Modi project, which was said to have weakened after 2024, has regained strong legitimacy. High female voter participation, targeted cash transfers and social security programs are considered important ‘silent game-changers’ in this.

The Bihar result raises the question – why do voters turn to the ruling party with a strong organization and a positive agenda even when they are dissatisfied? The problem of the Indian Congress is not in seats, but in self-awareness. Despite its stable vote share, it is unable to convert votes into power because it sees itself as the old ‘grand old party’. Now it must compete not with moral superiority, but with energy, humility and a solid program like a startup.

In Bihar, the grand alliance raised issues like ‘voter list manipulation’, ‘caste census’, ‘income inequality’, but a large section of voters were seen standing in favor of development, stability and targeted facilities. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s long-standing ‘outrage-centric’ political style, where Modi, RSS, Adani-Ambani, Election Commission, and now Jay Shah and the Cricket Board as new issues are constantly targeted, could not be connected to a concrete program to improve the daily lives of the voters.

Bihari voters have once again made it clear that the power of a promise of a positive future (like 2014’s ‘Acche Din’) cannot be replaced by a mere story of ‘how bad your opponent is’. Nepal is currently at a historic juncture. Former Chief Justice Sushila Karki has become the interim Prime Minister due to the Gen-G movement. On her recommendation, Parliament has been dissolved and elections have been scheduled for 21 Falgun.

The opposition parties in India have failed to convert their anger into votes. In Nepal, anger has exploded on the streets, but the path to transforming that energy into institutional political options is unclear. In India, voters chose development and stability over the slogan of ‘remove Modi’, while the youth in Nepal are saying ‘remove corruption, remove old leaders’, but it is still uncertain which option they will choose in Falgun.

The problems facing Nepal’s party system are similar to the crisis facing the Congress in India. Although the Nepali Congress calls itself the ‘founder of democracy’, and the UML and the Maoists ‘heroes of change’, in the eyes of Gen-G, they are all just part of the same old political class. They understand that despite the changes in the constitution, elections and coalitions since 2062/63, there has been no meaningful improvement in governance, tolerance towards corruption and attitudes towards youth.

If the Congress in Bihar needs to introspect on how to increase its stable 20 percent vote share to 27, then the Nepali Congress or the UML should also ask the same question – ‘We still have village-toll organizations, old social networks, historical symbols, and a permanent voter base (core voters) in some states, but why did the young generation take to the streets against us?’

Although studies on the Gen-G movement have shown that misinformation and exaggeration spread on social media are mixed with the movement, the root cause is the lack of a credible political platform. When established parties fail to address the anger of the youth in an institutional way, rumors and simple accusations of ‘everyone is the same’ take center stage.

If Nepal’s parties maintain their old power-centric and ‘clientelistic’ style and try to attract the youth through superficial programs to gain popularity, they may end up becoming only the ‘default option’ in the eyes of the voters. But whether such superficial reforms will strengthen democracy in the long term or just cover the old structure with a new color, a serious question remains. Because we are an ‘electoral democracy’, but we are still far from an ‘institutional and program-oriented party system’.

The most common but essential humility required for Nepal’s parties right now may be this: First, to see themselves not as ‘natural rulers’ but as political parties that have lost trust and need reassessment. Second, to make leadership changes the result of a publicly defensible policy and program competition. Third, to demonstrate the ability to make the voice of Gen-G against corruption and ‘clientelism’ the basis of an institutional response, not a suppression. 

The parties themselves should focus the movement started by Gen-G on ‘street-based discontent’ and redirect that energy towards organization, policy, and the creation of new leadership.

If the discontented parties go to the elections in the upcoming elections only with the generalized anger of ‘asking an account from the old leaders’ or ‘everyone is corrupt’, the old parties can win again through some welfare programs, some symbolic commitments, and an organized election machine.

The strength of the Gen-G movement lies in its moral energy. It is not a single party, but a voice that holds the entire political class accountable. But moral energy alone does not last. When it cannot be transformed into an institutional political project, history often reinforces the old power. India's Aam Aadmi Party survived as an alternative because it was able to transform the energy of the 2013 'anti-corruption' movement into an organization, but such an organized new force is not clearly visible in Nepal at the moment, and even if it is visible, it is preliminary and fragmented. Therefore, the Falgun election will be decisive not only in terms of seat arithmetic, but also in terms of what kind of institutional language and leadership Gen-G transforms its anger.

In the end, the results of the Bihar election and the Gen-G movement in Nepal both say the same thing: in a democracy, voters cannot be organized for a long time by simply showing fear, nor by simply selling anger. Fear and anger can open the door, but to get inside, a positive future narrative, credible leadership, and an institution that remains consistently accountable are needed.

Nepal's established political parties, if they still see themselves as the 'default option' given by history, will fall into a long-term 'disconnect' like the Indian Congress. But if they can enter the election fray with humble introspection, organizational reform, openness to youth, and a solid economic and social agenda, not the Congress of the Modi era, but a 'startup' organization of the Karki era, then Falgun 21 may not be just another election, but the beginning of a new political era.

The message is equally clear for Gen Z. If the courage of the streets cannot be combined with the discipline of the ballot box, anger shakes the old system, but change often returns to the hands of the same old political class. Bihar has shown once again that voters give their trust back to even the ruling party that has been deemed 'completely wrong' when it can remain organized, agenda-oriented, and connected to the voters.