The issue of constitutional amendment has been heating up in Japan for four decades, from the streets to the parliament. Since 2001, the Japanese parliament has been working to advance the work of amending the constitution by forming a constitution review committee. Countless studies and reports have been made public that more than 70 percent of Japanese citizens are in favor of amending the constitution. Before the election, almost all potential candidates for prime minister have made speeches that constitutional amendment is their main political issue. However, the constitution has not been amended yet.

In 1993, the book ‘Japan’s Restructuring Plan’ by right-wing Japanese politician Ichiro Ozawa established a new discourse in Japanese politics. That was – the transformation of Japan into a ‘normal state’. In the book, he argued that Japan should move forward in the role of a normal state with military and diplomatic independence to actively play its role in world peace and promote individual freedom and market-oriented reforms within Japan and abroad. The provision in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which states that ‘Japan permanently renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes,’ has made Japan an exceptional state in the world today, and the idea that its amendment is the starting point for making Japan an ordinary state has been established in Japanese society since that book. However, the said article of the constitution is still intact.

This and many other such examples have clearly taught us one thing. Constitutional amendment is a political issue that always arises in a cycle in almost all countries around the world. There are many examples where constitutional amendment has not gained momentum despite broad consensus between political leaders and the general public in a country. There are also examples where it has been amended quickly. In other words, since constitutional amendment is itself a political process, the rhythm and speed at which it sets the path for continuity or change are certainly determined by political relations and events.

But in our current context, where the debate on amendment has received wide attention, an intensive discussion of the theoretical contradictions within the constitution, between the conception and practice of the constitution and the popular commentary seems inevitable. In present-day Nepal, arguments and commentary that reflect aversion to words like principle and philosophy are the most popular. However, the basis of principle and philosophy is indispensable for discussing right and wrong in politics or society. If thirty million Nepalis start discussing good and bad politics and society in thirty million definitions, it cannot spark a national debate on our problems, their causes and solutions.

In our current context, where the debate on amendment has received widespread attention, an intensive discussion of the theoretical contradictions felt within the constitution, between the concept of the constitution and practice and popular commentary seems inevitable. Contradictions within the constitution
First, when we promulgated the constitution in 2072 BS, we declared that we would move forward on the democratic path. However, instead of clarifying the basic nature of democracy and the mechanism to monitor its implementation, we scattered it. The minimum democracy (political participation of citizens limited to periodic elections) that we have practiced since 2046 BS was not and is not sufficient to become the democratic country envisioned by the constitution. Even between elections, we have not paid enough attention to developing tools to ensure regular dialogue between the state and citizens and to make them accountable. Due to this, the entire country has become entangled in various concepts, definitions and interpretations of democracy based on the 32 fundamental rights of the Constitution and the principle of federalism adopted as a tool to institutionalize democratic politics. The two main pillars of the democracy we have brought are - empowering citizens who have been structurally oppressed for a long time due to the inaction of the state so that they can compete even in normal circumstances, and for that, ensuring proportional representation in all sectors of the state from the policy-making level or addressing their voices.

Thus, our constitution has been stingy in envisioning a strong body that can identify the confusion or difficulties on the path to a fully democratic Nepal and order their immediate resolution. That is, it is envisaged that a democratic state will be built through a simple political process. The main objective of forming seven different commissions under ‘Other Commissions’ under Part 27 of the Constitution is to facilitate the completeness of a democratic Nepal. But the Constitution failed to envisage that instead of forming many commissions to carry out similar tasks, a unified monitoring and facilitation commission (even if for a fixed period) was needed.

The concept of such a complete democracy that regularly asks for, understands and operates politics based on the opinion of the people is also very weak. It has not even been made mandatory to ensure the regular political rights of the people through a system of holding elections at one level every two to three years. The three levels have been given the right to make laws, but our concept of active participation of citizens in formulating laws at each level is also very vague. It seems that the democratic system centered on the monopoly of elected representatives, i.e. minimum democracy, is still being promoted rather than the development of bodies and institutions that encourage and facilitate citizen participation. Now let us ask – despite the constitutional provisions for implementing the philosophy based on multicultural liberal principles envisioned by the constitution, are our politics seen as in the 2047 constitution or are such provisions not sufficient?

Second, the constitution, which initially began with a very philosophical mindset, gradually depicted the three-tier government as the senior, middle and junior government, and while maintaining the philosophy and principle, it seems to have reached the conclusion that ‘everyone should do it together’. This has made the specialized identity and role of the three-tier government secondary. If the specialized role of the provincial and local levels had been explained first, then the regular role explained, and the structure and identity determined based on the specialized role, we would not have reached the level-related debate that we are seeing now. Despite the practice of decentralization and decentralization, which led to a sustainable solution to the problem of identity (i.e., an unequal policy to be adopted on the condition of ending structural discrimination and empowering those who are discriminated against) by decentralizing the economic activities (especially revenue mobilization and capital expenditure) centered in the then Bagmati Zone, and the practice of formulating local development-friendly policies and plans, which could not be institutionalized, it does not seem to have been able to keep the unique identity as a 'Singha Durbar in every village' at the center with the objective of providing services provided by the district, zonal, regional and central offices at the doorstep.

In that, we could not sufficiently analyze why the second level, that is, the province itself, was necessary to make laws and policies, why its chief executive should be called the Chief Minister, and why the coordinating persons should be called ministers. In fact, the main complaints against the province were created due to the naming of positions within the province structure and the expectations that such names would create. The question of how scientific and practical it is to entrust the elected deputy heads of local levels with the leadership of technical committees – such as the Judicial Committee, the Local Revenue Advisory Committee – is also a complex one.

Third, the main contradiction that is being discussed with all these issues in the background is that the constitution, written with the vision of Nepali practice of direct democracy with full representation of all and regular dialogue between citizens and the government, ultimately institutionalized ‘elite politics’. On the one hand, all levels have made it mandatory to make the same type of plan in the same area. For example, 761 education policies, 761 health policies, 761 tourism policies, etc. have to be made. Every year, 761 policies and programs, 761 economic bills are formulated. The provinces and local levels have to spend the most energy on such plans, policies and programs.

On the other hand, so many technical responsibilities have been imposed on people’s representatives that it is difficult for them to even find time to communicate with the citizens. The very simple division of tasks, which requires that all levels of government operate in the same way, and that local levels in the capital of the country and those in remote Nepal adopt the same work, methods, and procedures, has institutionalized elite politics instead of the council politics that we envisioned, that is, dialogue politics that discusses every issue, and this is basically the main result of technical errors in the constitution.

Contradictions outside the constitution
A clear picture of the Nepali model of democracy, the lack of a body to monitor the implementation of democratic principles, and the institutionalization of elite politics are contradictions within the constitution. But there are similar contradictions outside the constitution as well.

First of all, it is time for us to ask an honest question – a person fell ill. He went to the doctor. He got checked and took medicine. He comes home and takes medicine when he feels like it and does not take it when he does not feel like it. And then he says – the medicine is finished, the doctor is finished. Is his accusation correct? Similarly, has the constitutional amendment we are discussing now been fully implemented? Are we not questioning the quality of the constitution or the constitution without fully practicing it?

When we discuss the constitution, we should consider whether the principles it adopted to solve the political problems it tried to solve were correct or not. Has the structural discrimination in Nepal, which was widely agreed upon before the promulgation of the constitution, ended? Is it impossible to solve it through the constitution? Do we have a beautiful alternative?

Second, the constitution envisions the empowerment of every backward citizen. But in daily politics, the phrase ‘despite limited means and resources’ is hanging on the lips of all policymakers. When such phrases receive high priority, there is a risk that the areas and communities envisioned by the constitution will be further harmed and their problems will be overlooked. Can the constitutional amendment give the desired results while keeping the question of why the essence of the constitution can guide our politics intact?

Third, Nepali politics has long been plagued by the contradiction that on the one hand, there are structural and institutional obstacles to the country's economic and social development, and on the other, the only option for solving them is a change in political figures. The structures and institutions that hinder development do not continue due to political figures alone. In particular, the discussion of the implementation of the constitution is incomplete without an integrated discussion of the structural, institutional, and practical reasons why our constitution and the politics envisioned by the constitution cannot be institutionalized. And, such a discussion needs to be theoretical.