If we look at the history of human civilization in a single thread, its center is not only war, religion or economy, but also ‘statecraft’. Statecraft is not just the skill of running a state, it is a complex combination of power, institutional memory, national interest, diplomatic balance and political continuity. It is not the product of any particular ruler, political party or generation, but the collective accumulated knowledge of centuries of experience, struggle, failure and achievement. Even before the emergence of the ‘Westphalian’ state system, empires, city-states and tribal confederations had practiced a specific type of statecraft.

When discussing democracy, we often talk about elections, changes of government and public opinion. In fact, the real power of democracy lies in those invisible institutional traditions of the state, which do not allow the change of power to transform into a crisis of the system. This is why, in any mature democracy, the government may change, but the basic direction of the state does not change. There are many reasons why the emerging populist politics of our country has become a subject of serious intellectual debate. This question is not just about any particular party, leader or government, but about the devaluation of statecraft, distrust in institutional continuity and the extreme influence of populist political culture.

State: A legacy older than the nation

The concept of the modern nation-state is believed to have developed mainly after the seventeenth century. But the continuity of statecraft is thousands of years older than that. Kautilya's economics, the political thoughts of China's Sun Tzu, Plato and Aristotle, the administrative system of the Roman Empire or the diplomatic practices of the Islamic Caliphate or Machiavelli's 'The Prince' - all of these tried to find an answer to the same fundamental question - how does the art of using power develop and how does it disintegrate? That is, even before the birth of nationalism, there was a state, power and diplomacy, a system for protecting national interests. Modern democracy has not replaced statecraft, but has only given it new legitimacy and accountability. Therefore, in any democratic society, institutions are above the individual. The government is temporary, the state is permanent. Leadership is changeable, institutional memory is long-term. British politician Edmund Burke did not justly call democracy ‘a compromise between the dead, the living, and the unborn’. This is why democratic states consider tradition not a burden, but a priceless and unique asset. The problem arises when the political leadership begins to consider this structure as ‘old baggage’. This is not just a question of political ignorance, but a childish mentality that sees personal popularity as a substitute for statecraft, resulting from deep theoretical confusion. History has an equally interesting tradition of individuals who have disregarded the tradition of statecraft making a mockery of pride.

Historical context

The fall of Athens: As Thucydides describes in his ‘History of the Peloponnesian War’, the destruction of Athens was not simply a military defeat. Populist leaders like Cleon threw the tradition of mature statecraft into the wind and went after emotional public opinion. The destruction of the Sicilian campaign was a direct result of this populist crowd-psychology—in which the personality of Alcibiades came to hold the conscience of the entire statecraft hostage.

The Fall of the Roman Republic: The fact that institutions do not collapse all at once—their decay is the most timeless lesson of political statecraft is that. From the Gracchus brothers to Sulla and Pompey to Julius Caesar, at every stage some institutional value was undermined. Caesar’s ‘Veni, vidi, vicchi’ (I came, I saw, I conquered) was not just a declaration of military victory, it was a brilliant farce of the symbolic grandeur of the centralization of statecraft in a single figure.

The Weimar Republic: The most important statecraft crisis of the twentieth century is the fall of the Weimar Republic in Germany. Thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Karl Schmitt, and Walter Benjamin have analyzed this decline from various angles. The root problem of the collapse of the Weimar Republic was that a combination of economic discontent and national humiliation created an environment for the rise of a populist leadership, which made it common to declare institutions ‘enemies of the people’. In the first quarter of the twenty-first century, it seems that the same deadly style of the Weimar Republic is not becoming a common feature of the contemporary world. 

The common lesson of these historical examples is that the crisis of statecraft always begins with the erosion of institutional credibility, and populism becomes the result of this erosion, not a causal factor. Now our statecraft is repeating the negative rhythm of that history and is being degraded in Facebook posts of ‘disruption’. 

Since elections are only a tool in liberal democracy, the real basis is free and fair elections, freedom of expression, an independent judiciary, the accountability of elected representatives, and the institutional balance of power, which together create a ‘constitutional culture’. That is why, no matter who comes to power in the US, UK, Germany or India, the basic structures of the state can be seen to continue moving forward. The government changes, but foreign policy, security policy, administrative continuity and diplomatic culture do not completely collapse. When a political force starts to dismiss the old institutional legacy as ‘old baggage’, that is where the decline of democracy begins. 

The shadow of democracy

In the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new trend emerged rapidly in world politics – populism. Populism is not a complete ideology but only an agitated political style. From Peron in Argentina to the incumbent Habib Milley, Chavez in Venezuela, Orbán in Hungary, Trump in America and various right-wing forces in Europe, populism seems to have one common characteristic – ‘The people are pure, the institutions are corrupt.’ This type of politics can win elections. It can attract public sentiment. But it is pushing the country into ‘disruption’ by presenting institutional complexity as an enemy. Political scientist Robert Dahl, in ‘Poliarchy (1971),’ had written in ‘Poliarchy’ (1971) explaining the fragility of the electoral system – democracy is not just a set of electoral processes, it is a political culture, which is built through long-term civic education and institutional credibility.

Recently, political scientist John-Werner Muller has been saying that populists are often more skeptical of parliament, courts, administration, diplomacy, and the media, and Nepali experience is directly experiencing the fact. Muller basically calls populism a politics against democratic pluralism, a style that weakens the legitimacy of dissent, institutional control, and alternative political voices, which seems to be exactly suitable for the current situation in Nepal.

Ideology is changing but statecraft is continuous

An important question often arises – after a change of power in any country, why should the new ruler assimilate the pre-established statecraft patterns? The answer should not be sought only in diplomatic tradition—it is a question of the state's international credibility.

The politics of neighboring India is a field of deep ideological competition. The struggle between the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party is not just an electoral competition, it is also a debate over Indian 'ideology'. But after coming to power, the BJP government has not destroyed the state's long-term strategic foundations. The concept of 'strategic autonomy' has been in place in Indian foreign policy since the Nehru era. Various governments from the Congress to the BJP have changed their ideological color, but none have dared to destroy the original strategic framework of diplomatic statecraft. Relations with Russia, US-India partnership and suspicion, competition and cooperation with China, South Asian strategy—we can learn serious lessons from the continuity of the Indian state in all these areas.

No matter how much he gnashes his teeth in the electoral rivalry, Modi has not rejected the entire legacy of the Congress. On the contrary, he seems to be trying to give it a new ideological style (saffron color). Political ideologies may change, but successful states do not destroy their statecraft. However, for the BJP, the ‘saffron’ color is a symbol of past pride, cultural identity, and ideological commitment to Hindutva, so the opposition is criticizing it as ‘saffronization’. For the BJP, the statement that the saffron color is linked to the country’s original civilization and its basic values ​​is increasing concerns about the polarization of the fraternal Indian society.

The value of ‘disruption’

Trump’s rise in the American state structure, which is considered the most mature in the world, has raised a serious question – what if America itself becomes skeptical about its institutional continuity? His ‘America First’ policy not only changed foreign policy, but also seriously attacked the credibility of the liberal international order (NATO, WTO, climate agreement) built by America after World War II. Although American power was not immediately destroyed, the decline in its global credibility has become a major concern for policymakers, intellectuals, and the media there today. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt noted in their book ‘How Democracies Die’ (2018), democracy does not always end with a military coup, but also with the gradual erosion of institutions, and their theory of ‘democratic backsliding’ for the Trump-era America seems equally relevant and warning in global politics.

It is worth noting that the ability of a great power like the United States to withstand Trump’s executive shocks is the orderliness of its institutions, the activism of civil society, and the independence of the judiciary. Imitation of the Trumpist political style is certain to pose a serious risk for countries with weak institutional foundations like Nepal. We lack an ‘institutional buffer’. The independence of Nepal’s judiciary is faltering and the influence of civil society is shrinking. Some of the styles adopted by Balen and his administration are clearly showing the negative impact on institutional dignity and international credibility.

Digital Populism

The role of social media in understanding Nepal's current politics cannot be ignored. As British writer Timothy Snyder put it, public opinion is being guided by 'momentary emotional reactions' rather than conscious analysis, from 'preemptive obedience'. The rise of Balen-Ravi is a product of this digital tide. This inclination of the people is not just a wave, but the result of extreme disillusionment with the corruption of established parties, misrule, and the failure of traditional media. Social media raised the people's dissatisfaction as a 'demand', but in the process of 'supplying' it, politics has led to 'disintegration' instead of 'change'. The people expected reform of the system, but the results achieved have increased the risk of shaking the very foundation of the system.

The difference between change and disruption is that change follows the path of institutional strengthening and long-term reform, while disruption revels in immediate excitement and hollows out the very foundation of the state. Change enriches the depth of statecraft, but disruptive tendencies destroy its basic dignity. Social media has reduced complex political discourse to slogans, video clips, and superficial emotional responses. The ‘public debate’ envisioned by Jürgen Habermas as the foundation of democracy has become a prisoner of excitement and polarization due to today’s algorithms. Contemporary political trends are built on this digital culture. The arrival of new forces in democracy is a natural and inevitable process, but the problem begins when ‘newness’ is considered the only qualification and institutional experience is automatically considered corrupt. From this point on, democracy is pushed from the ‘path of reform’ into the ‘vicious cycle of disintegration’.

Nepal’s lifeline 

For a geopolitically sensitive nation, diplomacy is the paramount dimension of statecraft. Nepal, strategically located between India and China, does not have the facility to make strategic mistakes. The survival of small nations lies not in the display of power, but in balanced diplomatic skills. सिंगापुरका संस्थापक ली क्वान युले भनेझैं, विवेकपूर्ण कूटनीति नै साना राष्ट्रहरूको सबैभन्दा ठूलो पुँजी हो । पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको ‘दुई ढुंगाबीचको तरुल’ भन्ने उपमा केवल भौगोलिक यथार्थ मात्र नभई एक कालजयी राज्यकलाको सूत्र हो । आधुनिक नेपालको सम्पूर्ण इतिहास यही सन्तुलनको जगमा उभिएको छ । तर, आज जब कूटनीति सामाजिक सञ्जालका नारा वा घरेलु राजनीतिक लोकप्रियताको साधन बन्छ, तब राष्ट्रले त्यसको महँगो मूल्य चुकाउनुपर्ने हुन्छ ।