Waiting for 'Balenomics'

The goals of maintaining an average economic growth rate of 7 percent (in constant prices), increasing per capita income to $3,000, and increasing the size of the economy to close to $100 billion within five years to become a respectable middle-income country are attractive.

Falgun 28, 2082

Bhojraj Paudel

Waiting for 'Balenomics'

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Where will the ‘Balenomics’ emerging in the morning lead Nepal? What are the challenges facing the new government led by Balendra Shah to implement the economic policies put forward by the RSVP, 2082, and deliver results? Will it be possible for citizens who voted for the RSVP in the hope of good governance, development, and prosperity to get the results they expected? Balen has emerged in the light of that possibility. But how will the economy of the country he leads move forward? Will he be able to deliver ‘Balenomics’? 

As the election results are coming in, the tone of the economic-political debate has changed. Earlier, the discussion of development was limited to general aspirations – we need roads, we need jobs, we need industries. Now those questions will be asked in a more rigorous manner – how fast? How measurable? And, most importantly, how much will be realized? Balen and the RSVP’s 2082 manifesto, which emerged in this environment, have simultaneously raised public expectations. The party and leadership are tightly bound to the expectations of the people.

The goals of achieving an average economic growth rate of 7 percent (in constant prices) to become a respectable middle-income country within five years, achieving per capita income of $3,000, and increasing the size of the economy to close to $100 billion are attractive. Promises such as creating 1.2 million jobs in five years, increasing installed capacity in the energy sector to 15,000 megawatts, increasing domestic consumption to 8,000 megawatts, reducing LPG gas imports by 50 percent, and building or upgrading 30,000 kilometers of national highways have solidified the aspirations of the people.

Establishing digital parks in every province by considering information technology as a strategic industry, removing barriers to international payment gateways, exporting digital services worth 30 billion US dollars in ten years, investing 30 percent of the expatriate capital in national pride and industrial infrastructure through the Nepal Production Fund and the Remittance Investment Fund to divert remittances towards production, solving the problems of the cooperative and microfinance sectors and establishing an integrated savings security fund, ending cartels-syndicates and building a competitive market economy, providing production-based subsidies in the agricultural sector, and doubling the number and expenditure of tourists in tourism within five years and making Karnali and the Far West a special destination. All these sentences mentioned in the pledge have tried to show the future of Nepal in a new framework.

But when reading these same sentences, another, deeper question also arises in mind: If the challenge for Nepal is not the lack of goals, then what is the challenge? Citizens have been changing their hopes in every election. They have been changing their plans and slogans. But why is it so slow to see tangible changes in the lives of citizens? Three issues are found at the center of the answer. Discipline of implementation, predictability of rules and reconstruction of economic confidence.

Nepal has a tradition of policies that look good on paper but are weak in implementation. There is a disease of projects being announced but not completed on time. There is a reason why rules are in the market but not implemented. And, there is insecurity that citizens cannot be sure about the future of savings and labor. Therefore, the real evaluation of ‘Balenomics’ does not start from ‘how big a goal was announced’, but from ‘how quickly the way the state works’. If the way of working changes, the goals naturally fall within the realm of possibility. If the way of working remains the same, the goals are added as a series of papers.

When we think of the countries that are talked about in the world for bringing about a concrete turn in their economies in five years, we find a simple but harsh truth. They did not perform miracles. They adopted order and discipline. Somewhere by reducing the hassle of taxes and licenses, somewhere by making the service flow timely and accountable, somewhere by concentrating on industry and exports, somewhere by making very disciplined investments in one major sector, they have created the experience of ‘now things work here’ within five years. The success of those countries is not in the name of the leader, but in the style of reform. Few priorities, clear rules, firm implementation and continuity. We do not need the courage to start many things at once, but the determination to complete some aspects decisively. Nepal has its own geographical, structural and institutional boundaries. Therefore, comparison is not for imitation, but for mirroring. We need to see our own form, identify weaknesses and adjust the order of reforms.

Now, if we look at the goals of the RSVP's manifesto, 2082, in this mirror, the first big test is employment. The promise of creating 1.2 million jobs in five years is not just a number. It competes with social psychology. Nepali youth are deciding to leave the country in search of employment. Because it is not only because there is no work here, but there is a feeling that there is no respect for work, stability, transparent opportunities and confidence in the future. Therefore, to say that the employment goal has been achieved, there should be a qualitative change in the labor market. Formal employment has increased, work according to skills is available, workers' income has increased and youth have started seeing potential in the country. This means that the question of where employment creation comes from should also be clear.

Infrastructure construction, energy expansion, tourism services, agricultural value chains, small and medium enterprises, information technology services—all these are potential sources of employment. But there is a danger here. The danger of a piecemeal approach, with no decisive momentum in any sector. The way to prevent this is to sequence and prioritize work. Which sector will provide the fastest employment in the first two years, which regulations will remove obstacles immediately, which projects will attract private investment, and which reforms will make the market competitive? The answers to these questions should be seen not only in the policy, but also in the calendar.

The aspirations shown in the pledge for energy and infrastructure goals should also be read at two levels. The level of numbers and capacity. The target of 15,000 MW of installed capacity and 8,000 MW of domestic consumption shows the basis for industry and service expansion. The promise to reduce LPG gas imports by 50 percent is a sign of reducing import dependence. Which is strategically appropriate for an import-dependent market like Nepal. But the problem that Nepal has repeatedly faced in the energy debate is not only production. It is transmission and distribution.

Even if electricity production increases, the industry does not get the quality and stable supply it needs, projects are not connected on time, the distribution system is weak, or the consumption plan does not increase due to policy confusion, making a big goal an ‘incomplete achievement’. The 30,000-kilometer target for roads and highways is also similar. The idea of ​​distance is great, but the issues that citizens feel are the quality of roads, safety, maintenance, landslide management, travel time, and transportation costs. Nepal is tired of inauguration-focused development. Therefore, the language of development should now be ‘service level’ rather than ‘inauguration’. Only if the rate of timely completion of projects increases within five years, the tendency for cost escalation decreases, the contract becomes competitive and transparent, and the actual cost of the constructed structures reduces, will those numbers be translated into the language of everyday life.

The proposed targets in information technology are indications of the possibility of turning Nepal’s future towards ‘service export’. When we hear aspirations like creating digital parks in every province, removing barriers to international payment gateways, and exporting digital services worth $30 billion in ten years, it seems that this is no longer just a ‘field of a few educated youth’, but is trying to become part of the national economic strategy. But more than physical infrastructure, rules, processes, and trust are the decisive issues in this sector. If the process of legally receiving payments from abroad is not simple and fast, if the rules on taxes and foreign exchange are not stable and clear, if the registration and closure process is not hassle-free, if data security and contract enforcement are not reliable, then a comprehensive skills center provides ‘addresses’ but does not increase ‘production’. On the contrary, in an environment of uncertainty, talent can work and live outside the country.

Like remittances, but in the form of an ‘invisible exodus’ of high skills. Therefore, the change that should be seen in information technology in five years is not in the number of buildings, but in the growth of enterprises that legally accept payments from abroad, the growth of high-wage jobs, and the increase in formal data on service exports. The achievements of all these aspects should be reflected in the index. For that, the state should not only remove obstacles, but also provide stability. The tendency of today's rules being one thing, tomorrow's another is the biggest enemy of this sector.

The goal of diverting remittances towards production touches the most sensitive area for Nepal. The idea of ​​investing 30 percent of the migrant capital in national pride and industrial infrastructure through the Nepal Production Fund and the Remittance Investment Fund carries the aspiration of 'migrant income not only in consumption, but also in capital formation'. This is correct. But its success depends not on slogans or structures, but on trust. The problems of cooperatives and microfinance have hurt the savings of a large group of people. That is why the social trust that 'savings are safe' is weak.

In such a situation, the talk of establishing a unified savings protection fund or tightening financial discipline is not a paper reform, but a matter of social rehabilitation. Only if savers feel that the money is safe, the risks are clear, the reports are transparent, the audit is independent, and violation of rules is punishable, can capital be drawn into long-term projects. Otherwise, the aspirations of the production fund and investment fund may be understood as a ‘money-raising scheme’. And, such schemes inadvertently fall into the politics of distrust. This is one of the most difficult tasks of economic transformation. It takes time to build trust. But a few moments are enough to break that trust.

The goals of agriculture and tourism also stand on a bridge between emotion and reality. The proposal of production-based subsidies shows that it will reduce false incentives and opacity in agriculture. But the factors that change the lives of farmers are not only subsidies. Markets, storage, moisture management, transportation costs, insurance, processing industries and price stability. If farmers increase their production but do not get good prices, there is a lot of loss after harvesting, if there is a monopoly in the market or if transportation costs eat up profits, agriculture cannot become a respectable profession. Therefore, the improvement seen in agriculture in five years should be seen in ‘system improvement’ more than field production. Post-harvest losses should be reduced, storage/processing capacity should increase, the real price received by farmers should increase and import dependence should start to decrease in some commodity groups. 

The goal of doubling the number of tourists and spending in tourism in five years is similar. There is potential, but for that, improving the tourist experience is essential. Tourists come to see the country and place. But when they return, they tell their experiences. Reliability of transportation, safety, cleanliness, digital facilities, service culture, policy stability. Making Karnali and the Far West a destination in particular is not just propaganda, but a program to connect accessibility, health security, local enterprises and the income base of the local community. If all these issues are woven into one thread, tourism can start a new cycle of employment and income in these areas.

The 'silent prerequisite' that makes so many goals possible at once is good governance and a competitive market. If 'cartels and syndicates' capture the market, collusion increases prices or rules are not implemented, productivity in any sector will not increase sustainably. Competition is not just a matter of consumer interest. It is a matter directly linked to the cost of entrepreneurs, the real income of workers and the efficiency of the economy.

Similarly, if public procurement is not transparent, contract management is weak, and projects are slow and expensive, infrastructure goals can turn into a list of debts and incompleteness. Therefore, the success of ‘Balenomics’ lies not in a grand political statement, but in daily administrative practices. Whether taxpayers get services on time or not, whether entrepreneurs get registration and licenses in one place or not, whether project progress is openly visible or not, whether financial fraud is punished or not, these seemingly small but profound changes build ‘trust’ and once trust is built, big goals become possible.

Five years is a short time for economic history. But it is also decisive for political economy. Nepal may not be completely transformed in five years, but in five years it can be clear whether Nepal has taken the right direction. यदि पहिलो वर्षमै केही ठोस संकेत जस्तै नियम सरलीकरण, अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय भुक्तानी सहजता, पारदर्शी खरिद, सहकारी समस्यामा न्यायोचित कार्य, बचत सुरक्षा संरचनाको विश्वसनीय प्रारूप, ऊर्जा वितरण सुधार, उच्च प्रभाव पर्ने केही आयोजना समयमै सम्पन्न भए भने नागरिकको मनमा एउटा नयाँ वाक्य जन्मिन्छः ‘सायद अब हुन्छ ।’ यही वाक्य नै अर्थतन्त्रको अदृश्य पुँजी हो । उल्टो गरी, यदि सुरुवातमै पुरानै ढिलाइ, पुरानै अन्योल, पुरानै अपारदर्शिता दोहोरियो भने लक्ष्यहरू जति सुन्दर भए पनि नागरिकको मनमा अर्को वाक्य बलियो हुन्छः ‘फेरि उस्तै ।’ त्यही वाक्यले पलायन बढाउँछ, बचत थन्क्याउँछ, लगानी रोक्छ र अर्थतन्त्रलाई आफ्नै शंकाको जालभित्र फसाइदिन्छ ।

अन्ततः ‘बालेनोमिक्स’ को चुनौती यति मात्र होः आकांक्षालाई अनुशासनसँग बाँध्ने, घोषणालाई प्रमाणसँग बाँध्ने र भविष्यको चित्रलाई आजको व्यवहारसँग बाँध्ने । ७ प्रतिशत आर्थिक वृद्धिदर, ३,००० डलर प्रतिव्यक्ति आय, १०० अर्ब डलर अर्थतन्त्र— यी ठूला लक्ष्य हुन् । तर ती लक्ष्यको पहिलो सर्त ‘बढी कुरा बोल्नु’ होइन, ‘थोरै काम गरेर देखाउनु’ हो । पाँच वर्षपछि नागरिकले आफ्नो जीवनमा अनुभव गर्ने परिवर्तन भनेको रोजगारीको उपलब्धता, आम्दानीको सुधार, सेवाको सहजता, बचतको सुरक्षा, बजारको निष्पक्षता र राज्यको जवाफदेहिता हुनुपर्छ । जुन वास्तवमा आर्थिक रूपान्तरणका प्रमाण हुन्छन् । यही प्रमाण दिन सक्ने वा नसक्ने ठाउँमै ‘बालेनोमिक्स’ को इतिहास लेखिनेछ ।

Bhojraj

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