We have long complained that politics has not followed the path it should have. We have criticized it. We have expressed concern. We have vented our anger. Sometimes we have even cursed it. Whenever such complaints, anger, and concerns of the people increase, then waves of change have also taken that as the basis of political power.

The people's movement of 2046, the Maoist people's war that began in 2052, the second people's movement of 2062-63, the Madhesh movement and the movement of 23 and 24 Bhadra 2082 have all had a similar chain or role behind them.

The joyful and challenging participation of the people, the movement being completed amidst huge loss of people and property, but after some time, it has become a regular phenomenon of Nepali politics to get confused around old and basic issues again. Even after major political changes, Nepali politics does not follow the path it has formulated itself, why? This is a question that we all need to discuss honestly today.

For this, separate and joint analysis of three different questions is necessary. First, is the main path we have set politically correct? Is it reliable? Second, if so, how far and how far is our politics from that path? Third, what are the reasons for the gap between the path we have set and our current journey? In other words, what are our practices today that have not allowed our politics to follow the expected path. Without a collective review, realization, and common acceptance of such questions, decisive improvements in our decades-old social, economic, and political problems cannot be made.

The paved road of our politics

After a long political ups and downs, a new constitution was promulgated in Nepal in 2072. There was national acceptance on certain issues in the constitution and surrounding political developments. First, there is huge economic and social inequality in Nepal in the areas of ethnicity, region, gender, etc.

Second, there is an integrated effect of economic, social, and political reasons behind such economic and social inequality. There is structural injustice here. Third, the main reason for the continuation of such inequality is the politics of ignoring the participation of those who are being decided in the decision-making process. Such political culture and practice have institutionalized social and economic injustice.

In her book ‘Democracy and Inclusion’ published by Oxford University in 2004, political scientist Iris Yong has depicted it as a situation of normative legitimacy deficiency, arguing that in such a situation, marginalized communities question the legitimacy of the political system. After 2062-63, the practice of analyzing political problems by focusing on his concept remained very popular in academic and political circles.

Fourth, to make such a reform, it is appropriate to start with politics, that is, the distribution of power. Fifth, a radical change or reform in the principle of social justice that has been in Nepali practice since 2046 is essential. Classical liberalism, which states that all citizens are equal, has increasingly widened the inequality gap in Nepali society instead of reducing it. Therefore, an unequal policy must be adopted to end inequality. In this sense, the principle of justice adopted by Nepal to eliminate inequality is very close to the argument that an unequal policy can also be followed on the condition that the weak are benefited by the second principle of justice of modern liberal philosopher John Rawls, namely the argument that an unequal policy can also be followed on the condition that the weak are benefited.

Sixth, a prosperous Nepal can be built only by building a society where everyone can compete with everyone through the method of empowering members of marginalized communities who were oppressed for various reasons in the past. At that time, this was called New Nepal. Here too, it seems that the major philosophers who developed and expanded John Rawls's liberal theory of justice, Amartya Sen and Will Kimley, tried to maximally include the concepts of the capabilities perspective, multicultural society, minority rights, and group special rights.

The question arose of how to put all these issues into practice. First, there was general consensus that it was impossible to imagine retreating from minimal democratic practice. Second, it was concluded that the practice of the majority system everywhere discouraged the representation of citizens of marginalized areas and communities in the political decision-making process.

Therefore, a policy was adopted to ensure their representation and adopt the non-majority principle in meetings, assemblies, and committees that make decisions on matters that directly concern them. Dutch political scientist Aran Lijspart had concluded long ago through long studies and comparative research that parliamentary and consensual democracy is appropriate in a country like Nepal, which is full of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity. We also decided to adopt the same path.

Third, good practice in decentralization of economic and administrative activities, which were economically concentrated only in the Bagmati Zone and a few other limited cities, was essential. Almost two-thirds of the internal revenue and expenditure collected by the state was concentrated in the Bagmati Zone and a few other limited cities. In such a situation, a three-tier government was conceived with the conclusion that administrative divisions with local and regional economic powers were necessary.

On the other hand, its justification was also confirmed as a tool to address the issue of high identity. We have never adopted the current state structure for the continuation of yesterday's economic structure and situation. Here, a clear and indispensable objective is hidden to increase revenue and manage the necessary resources and run programs for the empowerment of every citizen.

In this context, it was concluded that democracy with the principle of a multicultural society and a non-majoritarian system in a particular place and context would be suitable for Nepal to establish social justice. We concluded that a federal system and a democratic system that can reach the common citizen at every level of the state would be the appropriate tool to put such a principle into practice.

Therefore, the constitution and political agreements that we issued after a decade of political transition were not only based on a clear recognition of the problems facing Nepal and the Nepali people, but also had a clear philosophical and theoretical basis. That is, the path through which we concluded to establish social justice did not and does not have any major problems. We had determined the path ahead of us based on the knowledge gained by the world based on long experience, research, investigation, and analysis.

A self-criticism is also essential here. Democracy is our path, if it is a principle, then federalism and republic are only the tools for building a democratic Nepal. But if we look at the practice of the past decade, our debate has basically focused only on the tools. Especially, we have focused only on the structure, utility, and effectiveness of federalism and, among them, the provinces. We have always kept the debate on the principle and path of social justice that we have decided on ourselves in the shadows.

In this way, we have formulated a solid road of social justice that will bring about radical changes in the lives of Nepal and Nepalis. Just as Mao had presented the theory of new democracy for the transformation of his country's semi-feudal and semi-colonial society in the 1940s, our democracy was also a theory of integrated solutions to all the problems of our society, and its relevance has not diminished at all today.

It is certainly necessary to discuss the question of whether there were potholes on this paved road. Until such potholes are filled, our journey cannot gain momentum and will not be safe. There were some potholes or ambiguities or inconsistencies.

First, the theoretical gaps between the eyes or perspectives through which the inequality prevalent in Nepal was understood and the solutions we sought remain. Up to and around 2062–63, there were two major critical perspectives on the inequality prevalent in Nepal. On the one hand, class inequality was thought of based on Marxist concerns.

On the other hand, it was viewed through the eyes of the normative legitimacy of Iris Yong, mentioned above. To bring about equality on their basis, redistribution or maximum democracy with active participation of stakeholders in every process of decision-making on their own issues would be necessary. There has been no proper assessment of the relationship between such principles or arguments and the current system.

Second, Nepalis are basically collectivists. We have a habit of looking at the wishes, desires, and opinions of the people around us not only for good and bad but also for choosing what we like or dislike. Even when we drink tea at a tea shop, we pay attention to the choices of friends we have gone with and the crowding situation in the shop, etc. In such a situation, it is natural that the principle of justice, which considers every individual as a citizen and manages their abilities, does not easily find acceptance. More efforts are definitely needed to explain the difference between our thinking system and the principle of justice and to bring about identification.

Third, as mentioned many times above, while formulating the path of democracy, we did not consider that a minimum democracy that considers periodic elections as everything is necessary, but a maximum democracy that puts accountability at the head through maximum and continuous participation of the people. In every country where democratic practices based on multiculturalism have been successful, there is a practice of maximum democracy. Therefore, our democracy is like putting an elephant's clothes on a mouse. In other words, until the practice of maximum democracy is accepted, our situation will remain complicated.

How is politics drifting to the edge?

Even though we have prepared such a good path, our political journey is still drifting to the unpaved, muddy, and muddy side of the paved road instead of coming to the main path. In other words, building a democratic Nepal for social and economic justice has not become the main rule of politics.

It has three dimensions. First, there is a lack of a powerful political group that claims ownership of this paved road as ours. Our principles or tools of social justice have long suffered from an opportunistic tendency to adopt only a few limited and immediate political gain-giving principles or tools, rather than adopting them for everyone, and to remain silent on the rest.

As mentioned above, the two main critical perspectives that portrayed inequality in Nepal, Marxist and identityist, were popular. Sadly, thinkers and activists from both the class and identityist sides could neither stand firm about their solutions, nor could they present the latest solutions that were appropriate for the era. Their role was limited to identifying the root causes of inequality as something that happens in a society dominated by crony capitalism or a society dominated by Brahmins and Kshatriyas.

Second, utilitarianism dominates our politics. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that we are all followers of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. We always advocate for the maximum happiness of the maximum number of citizens. We always use terms like ‘despite limited resources and means’. We try to remind citizens that not everything can be done at once. We even accuse citizens of putting forward their own ideas and demands without considering the situation of the country. In other words, we are busy establishing the narrative that it is not a matter of right, but of duty to move Nepal forward today.

But we never asked – what is the relationship between our thinking and the above-mentioned state of social (in)justice? Who are the citizens who fit into the definition of maximum in this country and who do not? Since when were they outside and what is the price our society, politics and economy will have to pay if they are still outside? How much? The current state of productivity of our society, where only a limited population has skills and education, can a country develop? Remember, according to the Human Development Index report, citizens over the age of 25 in Nepal have received an average of only 5 years of formal education. 

Third, current Nepali politics is plagued by ‘populism’. सहरकेन्द्रित, सामाजिक सञ्जालमा सक्रिय नागरिकहरूलाई विचरा, निरीह चित्रित गरेर, तिमीहरूले दुःख पाएकै म जस्तो एक जना असल नेता नभएर हो भनेर बाँकी सबै राजनीतिक पात्रलाई भ्रष्ट चित्रित गर्ने र नागरिक उत्तेजनाका आधारमा आफ्नो लोकप्रियता हासिल गर्ने लहरमा छ, हाम्रो राजनीति । यहाँ सामाजिक न्यायको सिद्धान्त, हामीले अवलम्बन गरेका सिद्धान्त र औजारबीचको तादत्म्यताजस्ता सघन छलफललाई नै वाहियात चित्रित गरिन्छ ।