We often interpret political crises in one country in South Asia as ‘exceptions’ – as the result of a particular history, leadership or social structure. But the practical reality is different. Many crises in the region are not sudden, but the result of long-term structural decay, weak governance capacity and a gradual erosion of legitimacy. The political instability, street-centric power and institutional distrust in Bangladesh after Sheikh Hasina are not a distant phenomenon for Nepal – they are a clear early warning.

This similarity is not ideological, it is functional. The fatigue that arises after the democratic transition, the decline in governance performance, and the gap in state-citizen relations – all these processes weaken the state from within. This weakness ultimately makes the road decisive and the institution reactive. Nepal must learn this lesson now – if it is too late, it may have to repeat the experience of its neighbors.

Lessons from neighbors

Three recent crises in South Asia – Sri Lanka (2022), Myanmar (since 2021), and Bangladesh (2024) – have given Nepal three important messages.

Sri Lanka showed that economic mismanagement and elite arrogance can bankrupt a state overnight. Once the economic crisis deepens, it loses political legitimacy, social security, and even national sovereignty. Foreign exchange shortages, energy crises, and failures in food imports have brought millions of people to the streets. The president was forced to flee. This was the political price of economic failure.

Myanmar showed that when the military becomes the political decision-maker, democracy becomes a mere paperweight. After the military intervention, Myanmar was pushed towards civil war, ethnic insurgency and regional disintegration. State authority was slipping away from the centre. External powers used internal divisions as geopolitical tools. This is the long-term price of military aggression.

Bangladesh recently showed that when governance becomes authoritarian, institutions become individualistic and attempts are made to control public discontent through repression, a single event can bring down the entire system. The student movement was initially a legitimate demand, but later turned into street power. Bangladesh is now at risk of constitutional ambiguity, religious extremism and regional intervention.

Nepal should learn the same lesson from all three: crises do not come all at once but institutional decay accumulates over decades. When that limit is crossed, it takes generations to reverse it.

Post-transition fatigue and erosion of legitimacy

Bangladesh and Nepal are both post-transition states. In Bangladesh, the post-independence secular republic and the authoritarian stability of the last decade maintained control of governance for some time. But that stability was not based on institutional capacity and social consensus. It was individual-centered and security-based. When economic pressure, political blindness, and erosion of legitimacy came together, that stability could not last.

In Nepal, the 2015 constitution provided an inclusive federal structure. Political representation expanded, recognition of identity was established. But the expected improvements in governance performance - service delivery, job creation, public security, and legal predictability - did not occur. As a result, public discontent is shifting from reformist demands to anti-system sentiment.

According to the South Asian experience, this transition is a major precursor to non-constitutional politics. Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh have proven this time and again. Nepal should think: Are we different or are we also on the same path?

Street power instead of institutions

The ‘okhlocracy’ seen in Bangladesh, where the street becomes the final arbiter, did not come suddenly. As trust in institutions gradually eroded, power in practice shifted to the streets, while parliament, judiciary and administration remained formally intact. This process was seen before the military rule in Myanmar, before the ‘Gotta Go Home’ movement in Sri Lanka and before the fall of Imran Khan in Pakistan.

Nepal is not there yet. But the ‘street veto’ power is growing – examples include the Gen-G movement, identity-based mobilization and the debate on the return of the monarchy. When public trust in parliament, political parties, police and administration declines, the legitimacy of institutional decisions begins to depend on the consensus of the streets.

This is a dangerous turn. Because street power is emotional, immediate and often short-lived. It lacks long-term strategies, constitutional limits and accountability mechanisms. When the street begins to replace institutions, state authority gradually weakens. This is the most worrying parallel with Bangladesh. Nepal must stop this situation – if it is too late, the path to Bangladesh is inevitable.

Youth Movement: Energy for Change or Strategic Gateway?

The student-led movement in Bangladesh initially carried legitimate discontent. But the lack of organizational discipline and institutional channels allowed Islamist, criminal and external ideological elements to enter it. The movement gradually became not only anti-state, but also oriented towards state-replacement. This process was also seen in the Arab Spring, the Hong Kong movement and the Myanmar youth uprising.

Nepal’s youth movements have so far been secular, transparency-focused and good governance-oriented. This is a positive sign. But when institutional politics is like a bar for the youth, when entry into political parties is based on inheritance or loyalty, when the representation of youth in policy-making is superficial, then the street becomes a political school.

This is a very sensitive situation in the South Asian geopolitical context. Because digital information warfare, INGO and NGO-centered activism, and external ideological influence are currently entering through the youth. The confusion spread on social media, financially supported movements, and the import of external agendas, all of these use youth discontent as tools.

History shows that unregulated energy does not remain neutral for long. Either the institution assimilates it or external forces weaponize it. Nepal must bring the youth movement into the political system, otherwise it will be uncontrolled like Bangladesh.

Ideological vacuum and risk of replacement

The authoritarian vacuum in Bangladesh was filled by Islamism. In Myanmar, the democratic vacuum was filled by military rule. In Sri Lanka, the economic vacuum was filled by political chaos. If a similar vacuum arises in Nepal, restorative nationalism, radical populism, or external ideological imports could take its place.

The risk is not in ideology. It is in the misuse of the vacuum created by weak state authority. When the state is no longer decisive, fails to provide services, or cannot deliver justice, ideological forces take over. They may be religious, ethnic, or agents of external geopolitical forces. But they are often not democratic. Nepal must fill this vacuum – through state performance, through service reform, through accountability. If it is too late, external ideology will take its place. Then, the state, which loses control, will have nothing left.

Weak state and external opportunism

In South Asia, internal weakness always invites external opportunism. In Bangladesh, the internal crisis gave way to regional and ideological powers. In Myanmar, China, Thailand, and India directly or indirectly engaged with internal rebels. In Sri Lanka, China, India, and the IMF used loans and aid as political tools. In Nepal, the risks are different—India-China strategic competition, Western donor-centric governance agendas, NGO influence, and information manipulation. When domestic discontent is not addressed by national institutions, it becomes a geopolitical tool. For example, if Nepal’s youth movement spends a long time on the streets without finding a solution within the institutions, an external power may support it financially, informationally, or diplomatically. The movement then becomes a pawn in geopolitical competition, not a national interest. When domestic discontent is not addressed by national institutions, it becomes a geopolitical tool. This weakens the autonomy of the state in practice, even if sovereignty appears secure on paper. Nepal must recognize this danger now – if it is too late, the geopolitical game of Myanmar and Bangladesh may be repeated in Nepal.

Attack on symbolic institutions

Secular media, cultural icons and minority communities were targeted in Bangladesh. Democratic voices were suppressed in Myanmar. The presidential palace was attacked in Sri Lanka. In Nepal too, the language of invalidating the constitution, republic, judiciary and media as an ‘elitist conspiracy’ is growing. This is a symbolic stage of the decay of governance. When symbols are weakened, when the constitution is called a ‘foreign gift’, when the judiciary is dismissed as ‘corrupt’ and the media as ‘biased’ – then the path to constitutional rupture becomes easy.

This process has been repeated many times in South Asia. Nepal must recognize this and stop it – if it is too late, institutional reconstruction will take generations after the symbols are destroyed.

Weak government: Catalyst for instability

Bangladesh’s interim government has lost its moral legitimacy but its executive power . Prolonged coalition instability in Nepal has given rise to ‘permanent interimism’ – the government survives but cannot implement reforms or maintain road discipline .

This sends a dangerous message – decisions are not implemented, laws are ineffective and change is possible through pressure . When the state appears weak, the road is strong . When the road is strong, institutional arrangements are useless . Nepal must break this vicious cycle, or else the path of Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh may be inevitable .

A strategic imperative for Nepal

The biggest current strategic challenge for Nepal is not just the internal governance crisis and the nature of democracy, but the restoration of state capacity . Performance legitimacy must be restored . Security, service delivery, employment and legal predictability – these are the basic functions of the state . When these fail, legitimacy shifts to the streets .

This is a structural challenge linked to the changing balance of power in South Asia. When the state is weak, geopolitics becomes a destiny, not an option. It is a historical fact that for small and strategically located states, internal instability becomes a gateway to external influence. Nepal is entering that sensitive phase today.

Youth energy should not be suppressed, but channeled towards institutional politics. Unless youth participation in local government, policy-making and public service is ensured, youth discontent will become the raw material of South Asian geopolitical competition. Bangladesh has taught us this lesson. Nepal should not repeat it. Time is limited.

Movement politics should not be criminalized, but made universal and institutionalized. The leadership, resources and ideological direction of the movement should remain within the national framework. When the state does not listen, external forces speak and at that time the national interest weakens.

And ultimately, credible elections are the only legitimate path to change. If trust in elections weakens, ‘street veto’ politics becomes a permanent option. The experience of South Asia shows that when the legitimacy of elections is lost, instability becomes generational. Nepal should not reach this stage.

Where is Nepal different?

Even if the question arises as to where is Nepal different, the possibility still remains. Is a Bangladesh-like scenario possible in Nepal? Functionally, if certain conditions emerge simultaneously, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. In those situations, prolonged regime paralysis, radicalization or capture of youth movements, normalization of street violence without legal consequences, widespread questioning of the legitimacy of elections, and external forces using public discontent for their own benefit. In this context, the lesson to be learned from Bangladesh is not focused on the well, but rather on gradual political and institutional decay.

Nepal’s democratic safety-valves still remain – competitive elections, civilian control over the military, the absence of armed ideological militias and a pluralistic media. Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have lost all of these or are on the verge of losing them. This is why Nepal is salvageable. But all of these are perishable assets. If they are not transformed into reforms, they will not ensure stability on their own. Every delay increases the cost of reforms and reduces options. Our neighbours have warned us. The question now is – will we learn or repeat?

Conclusion

Nepal’s future will not be determined by any single movement, election or coalition. The South Asian experience shows that if the state is strong, geopolitics can be managed. If the state is weak, geopolitics will manage the state. Nepal is now at this juncture. We must learn before it is too late.