A recent letter written by the mayor of Pakhribas Municipality in Dhankuta to the Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration has gone viral on social media. Frustrated by the ministry's rapid transfer of Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs), he has used sarcastic language in the letter, saying, "...it would not make any difference if they assigned responsibilities to separate CAOs every day..."

Although this letter from Pakhribas has received attention recently, in essence all municipalities are suffering from this problem in some way or the other, although its extent may vary. For this, let's look at the following news headlines: 'Authority at the local level is only nominal: MPs and ministers rush to replace municipal administrative officers,' '256 municipalities are without Chief Administrative Officers...', '238 local levels rely on acting heads', '10 years of state restructuring: Local governments are acutely short of Chief Administrative Officers', 'Municipalities are without Chief Administrative Officers, doubts about the government's intentions' etc.

These are just a few representative examples. Such news is read frequently and the number of news is increasing.

In the case of Pakhribas, it is understood that the mayor wrote the letter after being fed up with the transfer of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) in the last eight months. However, in some municipalities in Madhesh, up to five officers have been transferred in a single fiscal year. Until a PRPA is appointed under a separate law, the federal government has been deputing one PRPA in each municipality in accordance with the Local Government Operation Act.

Although the above issue seems to be a common practice for the federal government to send one employee to a municipality, it contains many questions from the perspective of local self-government, governance management, and personnel management. Based on these aspects, this article discusses why the PRPA should not be sent by the federal government for effective local self-government.

Local Self-Government: Unlike many other federal systems, Nepal has arranged a three-tier government and local government as a separate tier of government, while in many countries including the United States, the mother of the federal system, local government is placed under the jurisdiction of the provinces.

Since municipalities are the closest government to the people, they can better address the needs and priorities of the local people on local concerns than the federal and provincial governments, and since they are under the direct supervision of the local people, they are more responsible and accountable, and this has been done based on the belief and national and international learning.

The fact that the head of the local government staff, who has been arranged with such great ambition, is appointed by the union and is not under the control of the local government, is against the spirit of local self-government and the constitution. The constitution has envisioned the implementation of its rights and responsibilities through local service employees who are fully accountable to themselves.

This arrangement is said to be necessary to maintain the relationship of the union with the local government and to receive its reports on time since a large amount of financial transfer will be made from the union to the municipality. The first point of the commitment letter prepared by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration for the PRA mentions that reports should be sent to the federal ministries on a quarterly and annual basis.

Of course, in a tightly knit federal system like Nepal, a specific type of intergovernmental relationship and vertical accountability mechanism are necessary, which are much broader than reports sent to the union. These include issues such as the formulation of policies, laws, standards, financial transfer to encourage their compliance, appropriate monitoring and evaluation. They largely define the system and ensure the reports required by the union, and not any employee in particular.

Instead of working towards establishing such a system, it is ironic that the autonomy of the municipality is being played with by sending or not sending any employee from the union.

Governance: For local government to be effective, it is not enough to have sufficient rights and resources, a mechanism of accountability that is in harmony with the rights and resources received is also necessary. The situation where the union appoints the municipal CEO and they are basically accountable to the union government has neither empowered the municipalities nor made them accountable. The system where elected representatives are primarily accountable to the local people and voters, but the chief officer of their implementation mechanism is accountable to the union, leads to the collapse of the accountability ladder.

In such a situation, the local people cannot make the elected officials fully accountable. Elected officials get the opportunity to say that they are not able to work without a PRA or without a PRA who is accountable to them. This is never appropriate from a governance perspective. Remember, in a context where the controller should take responsibility to the extent of his control, the federal government should take responsibility for the impact on the functioning of the municipality by transferring the PRA too quickly or not sending it on time.

In our context, most public institutions are suffering from the problem of not providing sufficient authority and resources and not making the responsible officials accountable. This is the biggest problem in the overall governance system of Nepal. Universities, commissions, boards, foundations, etc. have been paralyzed due to this. And, the local (and provincial) governments that have been used amid great fuss in recent times have also fallen victim to this.

Management: In reality, the responsibility of the PRA of the municipality is broader than that of the federal/provincial chief/principal secretary and secretary. Since municipalities are integrated and comprehensive governments, the PRA has to fulfill the executive and managerial role in many matters. This includes laws, policies, plans, budget formulation and their implementation, resource mobilization, etc. Since the municipality also has to provide administrative, judicial, economic and social services in many areas, the PRDA also has a direct or indirect role in this. The situation of having to take work from employees (including teachers) who have come from different processes and the management of people's representatives from different backgrounds is in its own place.

In addition, the burden of delegated work from the federal and provincial governments is also the same. The work of almost all the ministries of the federal and provincial governments falls on the municipality itself. And, the environment in which all these works are carried out is completely different from that of the federal and provincial governments. That is, since it is the government closest to the people, all these works must be completed under the supervision of the local people.

Therefore, the role that the PRDA has to play is as multifaceted as it is challenging. In essence, the role of the PRDA is critical in the success or failure of the municipality. It is easy to imagine how the work of a municipality will be affected by the rapid transfer of any PDP or the absence of a PDP under its control.

From the perspective of management, the policy adopted by the federal government on deputing employees in municipalities is also contradictory. To be promoted to a special category of the federal government, one must not only be the most senior but also have undergone special training from the Nepal Administrative Training Institute, and none of these are required to become an administrative officer of a municipality?

The current system of deputing PDPs from the union is also directly related to the morale and career development of employees working in municipalities. Just as any employee of the federal civil service gets the opportunity to become the chief secretary, shouldn't the employees working in municipalities also get the same opportunity? The system of allowing someone who comes through the same process to become the head of a municipality immediately after being appointed, no matter how senior and experienced, is not only unjust, but also extremely discriminatory. What will be the morale of the employees of the municipality who are considered to be of a different category?

Now, let's briefly discuss how this practice started. When India was under British rule, district collectors were appointed as agents of the East India Company in each district, and they were responsible for collecting revenue within the district, managing local employees, and other tasks. Even after India became independent, the system of appointing representatives of the central government to the provinces and districts continued. Although this practice is still prevalent in other countries in Asia and Africa that have gone through the colonial phase. However, this practice is not practiced in countries that have implemented successful and effective decentralization and have progressed in the field of good governance.

In this way, this tradition, which started from a colonial background, was implemented in the case of Nepal in the old District Panchayat/District Development Committee and Municipality and later in the Village Development Committee. Even today, the example of India is given to justify the issue of appointing union employees in municipalities (and provinces). However, neither India's federal system is compatible with Nepal, nor is India an example of successful decentralization.

In the unitary system, local bodies (ZBI, VDC/Municipality) are extended branches of the federal government and their employees are recruited locally, so it was necessary to deploy them from the center on the basis of their lack of qualifications as per certain criteria. However, in the current context where both of these conditions are not present, trying to continue the previous system is a clear violation of the federal system and local self-government. The Constitution of Nepal has tried to take a big leap from past practice.

The question here is not about the honesty and intention of the PDPs deployed from the union. However, what kind of incentive structure do they work under and how much of a ‘stake’ do they have in the success and failure of the political leadership. Although they are said to be ‘accountable’ to local people’s representatives for their daily work, their basic accountability is to the union. Since they have to work under dual control and stay in the municipality for a short time, it is worth considering how much they can do even if they want.

Local governments have ample potential in terms of governance, service delivery and development. One of the main reasons why they have not been able to show their potential for the past eight years of operation is the existing system for delegating the PRA.