The times are such that whoever has more information is the most powerful. Whoever analyzes information in a smart way and can adopt the necessary strategy, becomes even more powerful. Therefore, from individuals to countries, the ability to obtain information, analyze it, and adopt the appropriate strategy is a basic requirement to remain strong and secure.

When an individual fails in this, only he may suffer the loss, and the loss may be small. When the country fails, the loss may also be big. This has become a big lesson taught by the Gen-G movement of 23 and 24 Bhadra.

76 people had to die because the state's intelligence agencies could not collect, analyze and adopt proper information and strategy. Many historical and modern buildings including Singha Durbar, Supreme Court, Parliament House and others were set on fire. This movement has become a reference to confirm the weakness and failure of the Nepali intelligence agencies. In addition, the need to take steps to make it efficient and effective has also been realized.

Young social media users who are running the 'Nepobaby trend' became angry against the government after the ban on social media was imposed on 19 Bhadra. Immediately, Gen-G had organized a movement for 23 Bhadra in preparation for raising their voice against corruption with a demand to expose it. But the intelligence agencies could not analyze it properly. The National Investigation Department (NID) did not mention the movement in detail in its daily reports on 21 and 22 Bhadra.

Similarly, the report submitted by the Security Council, which is led by the army and includes officers from the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and NID, since 20 Bhadra, did not include a serious analysis of the movement. The report sent by the Council to 17 agencies, including the Prime Minister's Office, on 22 Bhadra, a day before the Gen-G movement, did not include an analysis of the nature of the Gen-G movement.

It has long been discussed that intelligence agency reports are limited to information and analysis in newspapers and comments and expressions in the streets. The weaknesses in the preparation for the Gen-G movement, possible infiltration and the strategy to be adopted for peace and security have confirmed such discussions.

On the other hand, there is a tendency for the Prime Minister and the Home Minister not to take any information that is collected seriously. Officials say that the Prime Minister and the Home Minister do not open the sealed reports given by the intelligence apparatus. Similarly, the security chiefs do not have a tendency to be serious about ‘briefings’.

The then head of the National Intelligence Agency (Chief Investigation Director), Hutraj Thapa, did not get time to ‘brief’ Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. He had to report to the Prime Minister’s Chief Political Advisor or Chief Secretary.

Even Chief of Army Staff Ashok Raj Sigdel had been analyzing and ‘briefing’ the possibility of a major movement at the top level from a royalist group, a group of youths affected by corruption, or those trying to incite religious harmony. But later, Oli stopped listening to the Chief of Army Staff’s ‘briefings’. Instead, Sigdel was made to wait for hours in Baluwatar to meet the Prime Minister. On the one hand, the intelligence agencies are unable to really get into the business of obtaining and analyzing information, and on the other hand, the government leadership is ignoring it.

Why did the intelligence situation become weak in our country? It is clear – political interference. For a long time, the then home ministers used to recruit their cadres in the National Intelligence Agency. Before the promulgation of the constitution, 40 percent of the recruitments to the department at the level of jawan, ASI and inspector were done through covert (secret/opaque) and 60 percent through open competition. Covert appointments were influenced by those with access to power and authority, and there was also the possibility of financial manipulation.

Those recruited in this way were less likely to fulfill their primary responsibilities, and the political leadership running the government did not expect them to do so. As a result, the department was often used by the political leadership to collect information from opposition party leaders and conduct surveys during elections.

After the promulgation of the constitution, permanent recruitment of employees through 'covert' has been stopped. However, instead of making more efforts to make the department effective, the Oli government had prepared a draft law to break the path of legal appointments and pave the way for arbitrary appointments. Overall, the political leadership's efforts and practices do not seem to have the intention of making the department effective and capable. The impact of this has been seen time and again.

Our intelligence agencies must be agile due to the sensitivity of our society, geographical location and geopolitical changes. If intelligence activities continue in the same way as they are now, citizens and the country may have to bear additional losses of life and property. Security challenges may also increase for the country itself.