The Gen-G protests of 23 and 24 Bhadra left 76 people dead and hundreds injured. Property worth billions was destroyed through arson and vandalism of private and public properties. More than 18,000 prisoners escaped from various prisons in the country. The country's security and administrative agencies appeared to have completely failed to address and control the entire incident.

Established business families and even politicians became targets of violence on the second day. There was a search and search for beatings and harassment. Violent incidents of the same nature at the same time across the country were unusual. Prohibition was in force in the city, but those who instigated violence were free and free. They were not controlled or stopped anywhere. 

All these incidents took place before the eyes of the four security agencies, numbering more than 250,000, who are responsible for maintaining peace and security in the state. During the peaceful youth demonstration on the first day, apart from indiscriminate firing in Baneshwor, these agencies did not take any initiative to prevent destruction anywhere.

The Nepal Police, which was operational on the first day, was seen on the second day with its parts burned, weapons, uniforms and shields snatched away, and the soldiers surrendered naked and fled. However, other agencies were silent or anonymous. The then Home Minister, Chief District Officers and others did not say anything about this while they were in office and are now out of office.

An investigation committee has also been formed to investigate the role of security policies, bodies, individuals, processes and groups, who, where, what, and how much. In this article, while the question of why the Nepali Army, which is considered the main and last weapon of defense in terms of national security, did not come out of the barracks in that situation is being raised among the common people, an attempt has been made to dissect the media reports that have come out in favor of the commentary that the army itself is trying to make.

The national army itself is different from other security organizations. The character, thinking and ability of the leadership also play an important role in the functioning of the army and its image. The army's organization runs on a 'chain of command', not in public relations. Therefore, there is a significant group in every country that does not understand the meaning, importance and role of the army in a professional way, and an innocent group that believes that nothing done by the army is wrong or should not be accepted. There is also a social capital that says that there should be no public discussion about the army.

This time, it is seen that the army is trying to spread the message that it played an unprecedented and important role in history through retirees. But Nepali society is divided into two poles regarding the role of the army during the movement. It seems that more people question the role of the army than praise it. So much so that those who say the role of the army is positive in television talks, articles and public comments say in personal conversations that the questions raised at this time are justified and that they cannot be defended rationally. 

The first argument of those who admire the role of the army is that Prime Minister Oli resigned only after the army chief threatened that he would not be able to protect and defend him unless he resigned. On what law can the military leadership, which ‘acts only according to law’, demand the resignation of a sovereign, popularly elected prime minister? From any principle and perspective of objective control of the army, civil government-army relations and civil supremacy, it is in itself a very wrong and serious matter for the army chief to demand or pressure the head of government to resign.

The Constitution of Nepal and any existing law do not anticipate or expect such an act from the army chief, nor is there any precedent for such a practice. If we can praise the misuse of firearms/military power against dignity, this is a wrong example, signal and message for the future. 

Even when the headquarters of the state under its care were burned down, the army sat there and watched from the barracks, not coming to stop or extinguish the fire. Those defending this argue that since there is no decision of the Security Council, the army cannot come out of the barracks for internal security or violence control, protection of individuals' wealth and public property. The question arises here, can the army wait and see when all the major structures and private properties of the state are extinguished and the arson committed against them is extinguished and the time is favorable for it? Firstly, the units deployed to protect those structures do not need to take orders from their own headquarters or the decision of the Security Council to go out to protect them. They are structures deployed in such situations.

Secondly, the decision of the Security Council is necessary to mobilize the army or declare a state of emergency, when the police could not raise their hands and went directly to the emergency without seeking help from other security forces was not a practical option. Just as the Security Council did not have to wait for a decision to provide rescue and security to all high-ranking officials under ‘other responsibilities’ or VIP security responsibilities after the afternoon of Bhadra 24, similarly, the army deployed under the Essential Commodities Protection Act, 2012 and the responsibility of protecting important structures and the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2074 could and should have fulfilled its responsibilities.

In other words, the military unit stationed in the same premises to protect Singha Durbar, the President’s Office, and the Prime Minister’s Residence did not need anyone’s decision and order to take on the responsibility of controlling the arson and vandalism there. Because the national army, which is constantly working to secure the country, has no choice or option in performing its duties.

While the narrative that the army chief forced the Prime Minister to resign is being propagated on one side, there is no basis for the same military leadership to create a situation and place to hold a Security Council meeting. All high-ranking officials, including the acting Prime Minister, were under the control of the army, and there was also a technological option. It does not appear that the situation was unfavorable to the members of the Security Committee, the Chief of Army Staff and the Member Secretary, the Defense Secretary, to propose and initiate a legal decision or that there was anyone obstructing it.

Some are saying that the army will only follow legal orders or instructions. This is absolutely true. But the question arises, is the decision of the Security Committee (which will be there to support the army) to mobilize security agencies legal or not? If so, why did the army not follow it? Again, on Bhadra 24, after the Prime Minister resigned, how and on what basis did the Army Chief announce that the army would arrive only at 10 pm without a Security Council meeting and decision, and the army took to the streets accordingly? Officials informally say that the army was automated by submitting a letter prepared by himself to the President, and only later was the date of the curfew approved.

If this is true, where is the legal provision for the President alone or with the Prime Minister alone to make decisions of the Security Council or to mobilize the army without a meeting? More seriously, the law does not give the army the right to impose and extend curfews on its own, except for the Chief District Officer. Ordering a curfew against the procedure and later arranging the papers is also illegal. It is not ethical either. If the state is running in such a tradition, then wouldn't it be strong to say that the absence of a law is an excuse?

The target of the protesters was not the army. The previous day, the Kathmandu administration had mobilized all four security agencies, information was disseminated that the army was a backforce, and the army was seen in trucks in Baneshwor itself. But the question is why the army did not come down to help and rescue the police, who were at the forefront of crowd control and who had failed. If the army is hesitant to accept police leadership, support, and coordination as it has been in the past, then it seems necessary to debate how the justification for the army being an ex-officio member of the security committee under the Local Administration Act, 2028, which was made with the specific purpose of maintaining internal peace and security, is justified.

Another statement by the army chief and others is that 'the structure could not be saved by causing human losses'. The media is making a statement that the army has ‘lost the battle but won the war’ by saying, ‘If the army had taken to the streets with guns, many people would have been killed.’ The world is said to have praised the role the army is currently playing. In the case of the Nepali Army, which has had successful experience in peacekeeping missions under the United Nations in countries with different political, serious internal conflicts, and insecurity, this statement itself seems ridiculous and counterproductive.

Because the Nepali Army is now the first force in the United Nations peacekeeping mission because it has succeeded in maintaining peace by taking civilians with it, rather than by shooting, killing many people, or leaving them open. The obvious question is why the army has been indifferent to using the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and successful practices it has learned for peacekeeping elsewhere to defend its own country. As the Gen-G negotiator group called for registration, when the crowd was agitated, they had come out and requested Gen-G to choose a leader and come to the talks, and had miked that anyone who sabotaged would be shot and that the saboteur himself would be responsible for that situation. So much destruction would not have been seen.

The general public knows that there are many levels, steps, options and strategies to control violence before shooting and where to shoot. As long as the national army becomes transparent, responsible and accountable and can handle internal challenges, external military intervention is not possible as advertised. If the army had been seen outside in some way, the damage could not have been prevented/reduced, the infiltration could not have been prevented/reduced, why can it be said that Nepalis trust that the army will not commit injustice and are afraid that it will not give those who do it a chance to repeat it.

Overall, the army finally moved forward in a clumsy manner to bring down the Gen-G movement and was seen as the perpetrator. When the structures under its own security responsibility were destroyed, the army, which had been playing around, became interested in political handling and became entangled. It seemed to be a supporter of unauthorized people and power. The practice of managing political rebellions carried out by the Bangladesh Army, which has a different history, background, and reputation, was copied in Nepal. While it is said that this was a significant work in history from the military side, it has been controversial and suspicious in the eyes of the citizens.

The past also says that problems in the army-government relationship arise only when the head of an organization run and operated by a single command system of leadership is reluctant to follow the lawful instructions of the civilian leadership and imposes conditions. But now, the inability to make the right decision at the right time and take the right steps according to the context of the time is the incompetence and failure of the military leadership. Since it is an organization run by a single command system, the general is the army and the army is the general.

Even if there are hundreds of high-ranking officers and professional ranks, if the leadership is weak, their ability and commitment alone cannot bring a big difference in the character of the army. Even in the Nepali Army, which has managed to make a statement that it is the only public organization in Nepal that has not entered politics, the tradition of killing leaders through compassion and sequence rather than strength and using all kinds of tricks for that has been working. The army, which claims to be ‘closely monitoring the situation’, has become accustomed to shunning it when it comes to serious times when it comes to fulfilling its responsibilities, saying that it is not our job, there is no law, and it cannot be done. 

Meanwhile, the civilian government also does not pay necessary attention to the professional development and capacity building of the army, but the practice of aligning the weak and greedy among the available for personal and factional benefits, providing leadership, and making partners to benefit seems to be the real basis of the problems in Nepal's government-army relations. In addition, the outgoing Prime Minister, who never tires of shouting that he will not bow to big/world powers to arouse the ghost of popularity, seems to have submitted his resignation to the army chief without meeting the head of state.

If he had been loyal, courageous and committed to the system, he would have resigned the day his legitimacy was lost. If, as he said, the Baneshwor incident had occurred due to the non-cooperation or infiltration of the security forces, he could have immediately initiated an investigation and apologized and called the protesters for talks. Even then, the pressure from the army chief remained, like President Poudel, he would have shown the courage to say, 'Kill me or let me be killed, I will submit my resignation to the head of state.' They say - how cowardly are those who arrogantly hide their heads after their heads are broken, such rulers can neither protect the state system nor the nation. Due to its standard Oli trend, these and other weaknesses in the security mechanism continue to arise and be exposed. 

In the end, not only have serious questions been raised about the country's security administration and mechanism, the truth has been proven once again that no one except the citizens can protect the nation, nationality and politics. Not understanding the established fact that public trust must be earned and maintained in order to maintain the political status achieved is the blindness and incompetence of the civilian leadership. As a result, this has become a stain on the government-military relationship. Only if the outgoing Prime Minister and the Army Chief can be questioned simultaneously and opened up face to face, can we analyze and evaluate who is to blame and how much.