Fiscal constraints are fueling calls for more austerity in US foreign policy
More than 200,000 electronic monitors are linked together in trading rooms around the world, in geographic locations found on the global political map. The author Walter Stein made a conclusion through the book "The Twilight of Sovereignty (1991)".
Topics such as technology wars initiated by Trump, Chinese plans for a new world order, pandemics, the war in Ukraine and finally the climate crisis are major factors on the global political stage. The most important world stories in the decade from 2015 to 2025 are shaping today's politics. German sociologist Heinrich
According to Pupitz's synthesis, politicians modify what is naturally given for their own benefit, the tendency to use power over nature itself is the peak of such power exploitation over nature, power over other people as well. This is the deepest form of political power. By modifying the world of objects, we store 'data' or 'facts', which other people expose.
Less than six months into US President Donald Trump's second term, his administration's foreign policy is creating extreme paranoia around the world. The Trump administration's first half-year has been limited by tariffs on allies and rivals, threats to seize Canada, Greenland, and Panama, claims of the Nobel Peace Prize, an unprecedented job recommendation gift gimmick from Netanyahu, the first-ever bunker-buster bombing of Iran, the continuation of the Gaza massacre, and the supposed quick end to the Ukraine war.
American diplomacy is becoming a farce of profanity on the television screen. The Trump administration has almost destroyed the recognition that building alliances, credibility, and soft power are necessary to create order in a world full of complex international challenges. The Trump administration has blocked Washington's efforts to cultivate soft power, considering the US-led goal of building and maintaining a global order absurd. Rather than the continuation of the global system based on the
rule, a more self-centered strategy, i.e. priority strategy, has been adopted. A key commentary on this strategy is that even the US, with its limited resources, cannot devote resources to cultivating soft power in general. At the same time, China is America's biggest geopolitical enemy, which is the essence of Washington's strategy in the last two decades. The
priority strategy is just one of several approaches the Trump administration could pursue. In the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance distributed to the Pentagon last March, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth identified China as the "single pace-setting threat" and "rejection of the Chinese 'fate-accomplish' policy of Taiwan" as key strategic pillars.
The top priority of US foreign policy is being focused on preparing for the possibility of war on Taiwan by building an 'anti-hegemony coalition' in Asia. The strategy of priority has further exposed the activities of Europe and other regions, which are integral alliances for the Trump administration. The harsh treatment of NATO allies has forced Europe to reduce its dependence on Washington.
The Ukraine war appears to be a hot topic for Europeans. The Trumpian terms of the deal between Russia and Ukraine also put the US priority strategy at the center. Every US president since Obama has sought to 'pivot' US national security focus from Europe to Asia. They all agreed that the greatest threat to America is in Asia. If Trump's team succeeds in reducing US forces stationed in Europe and focusing on Asia, future presidents will be less likely to turn back.
After World War II, the United States adopted a preemptive strategy known as containment to confront its emerging superpower rival, the Soviet Union. Even if that strategy was initially considered flawed, the examples cited as refining it over time further illustrate the current Trump strategy. A central element of the
priority strategy is the recognition that US resources are limited. That is why the Trump administration has demanded higher defense spending from the NATO alliance. Strategists of the Western world system are concerned that some of the Trump administration's policies, which were already designed to prevent China's dominance in East Asia, have caused an unnecessary threat to the pursuit of that goal.
strategic equation
With the end of the Cold War, the US has been advocating a highly ambitious strategy, namely the creation, expansion and dominance of a liberal international order. But for the Trump administration, that arrangement seems absurd. Concerns remain that efforts to transform existing global politics will undermine American power and leave the US stranded with near-constant wars, an overextended military and "free-riding" allies. Liberal principles such as free trade and refugee rights have made the US unable to protect its domestic industrial power and control its borders, Trumpist commentary is becoming common. The
priority strategy is necessarily a middle ground between isolationism and the long-standing strategy of US global leadership. In addition to narrowing U.S. foreign policy goals, this also entails focusing entirely on the rise of a rival regional hegemon, China. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the US has faced no superpower rivals. Perhaps this is the reason why former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the US a 'must-have nation'.
Fiscal constraints are fueling calls for more austerity in US foreign policy. The United States carries a public debt of $29 trillion, roughly equal to US GDP. On top of that, the federal budget deficit has risen above six percent of GDP. As the US population ages, the US legislature has bowed to Trump's 'One Beautiful Bill', saying federal spending on Medicare and Social Security is rising.
Americans are facing tough trade-offs between spiraling debt, high taxes and entitlement reform, and it is being openly acknowledged that the global leadership strategy is becoming increasingly difficult to make the necessary military payments. It seems that Washington has little time and few resources left to manage the world while the US priority strategy is to prove itself as a powerful authority in competition with China. In this context, the Brazil BRICS Summit will discuss the American The
priority strategy has been unanimously condemned by Trump's orchestrated Middle East bombings. When not only India, Brazil and South Africa, along with Russia and China, but also 6 more Middle Eastern and African countries stand up as a vocal challenge to the American hegemony, it will not be otherwise.
Asia's balance of power is more uneven. China has the demographic, economic and technological power to dominate maritime East Asia and appears willing to do so. China is increasing its control over the South and East China Seas through coercive diplomacy and military pressure through the use of 'grey zone' tactics in Western understanding. The truth is that right now, China is modernizing its military and is determined to unify Taiwan sooner or later. In the logic of priority strategy, the goal of the race for regional dominance with Beijing is to confront China.
The 2017 National Security Strategy concluded that China and Russia are the main threats, as the first Trump administration renewed US goals in Asia. The Indo-Pacific region was considered as the priority theater. In 2020, the Trump administration announced the withdrawal of 12,000 US troops from Germany after pressure on the NATO alliance to increase defense spending did not comply. Now, in order to avoid repeating the same style again, the Holland NATO Summit has been forced to commit to increasing defense spending to 5 percent.
The Biden administration tried to direct more attention to Asia, seeking to improve relations with European countries. It presented the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021 as a step that would allow for a larger Indo-Pacific goal. Through a 'latticework' of security and economic initiatives with various regional partners, he sought to build an anti-China alliance. It initiated initiatives to limit Chinese military power through multilateral arms export controls. When war broke out in Ukraine in 2022 and Gaza the following year, the Indo-Pacific seemed to be lagging behind.
The second Trump administration is considering intensifying preparations for war in East Asia, particularly in defense of Taiwan. China maintains advanced arms export controls. Washington has raised Beijing's regional economic influence to the level of a 'trade-war', citing new trade, technology and development initiatives. It is clear that Washington does not need any pretext to break any agreements and understandings with Beijing.
For decades, Americans and Europeans have referred to their alliance as 'ironclad' and 'shoulder to shoulder'. Trump has torn up that script as they agree in Brussels conference rooms, the annual Munich Security Conference and World War II commemorations. The current tenure has begun with a shocking reception by Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance to the White House of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
In addition, stiff tariffs and "signal chat leaks" by senior US officials insulting European allies have strained relations. The Trump administration has not entered into a natural war but into an isolationist war. However, as beloved author Salman Rushdie said in one of his novels - 'To understand the world game, you have to swallow the world.' The
priority has not been digested not only by the European allies, but also by the partisan strategists of the US global leadership. All supporters of the US (center, left, and center right) share the view that a militarily powerful US, with a large coalition network, can take the necessary, dramatic lead of peace in world politics. Outrage from many parts of the foreign policy establishment over the Trump administration's cuts in foreign aid encapsulates the differences between old and new strategies. The
priority, like any strategy, tends to stand with trade-offs. The biggest is that diminished US credibility could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in some regions, an outcome that neither preemptors nor their critics prefer.
Already, the Trump administration's efforts to distance the US from Europe have cast doubt on the credibility of the NATO nuclear partnership program. Since the 1960s, Washington has pledged to transfer nuclear weapons to certain NATO allies in the event of a major attack. As US attention shifts away from Europe, confidence in that commitment has weakened.
Unresolved Conundrums
After declaring that managing China's rise is a major US national security concern, the US is not comfortable convincing its Asian allies to balance cooperation against China. Over the past few years, Japan has made some notable changes to its much-vaunted restrained security policy, including a commitment to invest in 'counter-strike' capabilities and increase military spending.
But Tokyo has not lifted significant legal limits on its ability to deploy military forces and cooperate with allies, and its defense spending is very low. 1.8 percent of GDP is planned in 2025. Taiwan's defense spending has also increased in recent years.
Even in the face of the Chinese threat, it is still less than 2.5 percent of GDP, which is only around the world defense spending average. America's Asian pivot, with all its resources and commitments, is clearly undermining the incentive to spend more on the security of regional allies.
Trump has made it clear that he is not ready to invest seriously in alliances or any specific strategy for the future of Asia. The Japanese and South Korean governments are increasingly emboldened by the fear that Washington will make a deal with Beijing at any moment, no matter what.
On the other hand, it is not unusual for the leaders of Seoul to be afraid that Trump may make a nuclear deal with North Korea. The transactional nature of the Trump administration is now eroding the lure of a cheap ride on America's ironclad allies. By making it impossible for both Beijing and Washington to achieve their core interests, the priority strategy is pushing the rivals onto a collision course.
Since the Obama administration, all U.S. presidents have recognized the need to shift U.S. military resources to Asia, and they all want NATO allies to agree to invest more in their defense.
A future US administration could reverse elements of Trump's foreign policy. But with the rapid transfer of scarce US defense resources from Europe to Asia, the chances of future US presidents bringing them back are nil. Although the new US national security strategy is in its early stages, there is little chance that the cloud of dreaded Asian terror will subside.
