In the past, power was understood as military strength, territorial control, and the ability to win direct wars. Empires were measured by the number of tanks, artillery, and troops. However, this definition has changed today. In the 21st century, the global power structure is undergoing transformation.

Power is gradually transforming into invisible structures, where economics, technology, and the global system have become decisive. Power is no longer so obvious, visible, and direct. It has become subtle, complex, and structural—hidden not in territory, but in networks and dependencies.

The geopolitical vision presented by Jake Sullivan (US National Security Advisor) reflects this changing reality. In his view, the competition of the 21st century is becoming more focused on ‘which country controls the key chokepoints (strategic nodes or dependency points) of the world system’ rather than ‘which country conquers how much land’.

This means that controlling geopolitical chokepoints is not just a military strategy, but a multifaceted exercise that involves economic power expansion, diplomatic influence, and technological control.

According to geopolitical analyst Edward Fishman, the world economy is dependent on a limited set of structures controlled by a few powerful nations. The US dollar system, international banking networks, semiconductor supply chains, and energy trade routes are some of the major chokepoints. The nations that control these structures exert deep economic pressure on other nations without resorting to direct warfare. Power is concentrated at chokepoints, where a country's influence/power is now determined by its GDP, production capacity, control of supply chains, and control over financial institutions. Institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund have become structural forces that influence the economic direction of developing countries not only through policy conditions, loan structures, and economic reform frameworks.

Second, technology is the main focus of today's power competition. Countries that have achieved leadership in areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, data, and cyber infrastructure have become power centers. For example, the competition between Huawei and Apple Inc. is not just a competition for market share - it is a competition to expand global influence through technology control. It is a long-term power struggle to build technology ecosystems, data control, and digital interdependence. More than direct military confrontation, the competition is now focused on chip design, algorithms, software, and data flow control, and the technology war is intense. Countries that control these new technological chokepoints have not only gained economic benefits, but also expanded political and geostrategic influence. Today, the world order is not static, but changing and competitive. There is no clear ideological division like during the Cold War, but strategic distrust and interdependence are deepening.

Third, system control is the most subtle but decisive dimension of the power structure. Today, whoever has control over areas such as world trade, Internet architecture, payment systems, and standard-setting makes the rules. That is why the world trade system, the architecture of the Internet, digital platforms, payment networks, and technical standard-setting institutions have become invisible but decisive pillars of today's balance of power. That is why the ability to block or facilitate access to international payment systems and financial networks has become not only an economic tool, but also a very effective means of geopolitical pressure.

The dollar system is at the center of the chokepoint. The dollar is not just a currency, it is the gateway to world trade. Countries with access to the dollar system can enter the world market. And those who do not have it are limited. That is why the dollar has become a kind of global power structure.

The United States stands out in this structure . Its dominance in the dollar system, influence in global financial institutions, and technological leadership have made it the center of the world system . 

Today's world order is not stable, but changing and competitive . There is no clear ideological division like during the Cold War, but strategic distrust and interdependence are deepening . Neither is it completely divided like the old Cold War, nor is it a unipolar stable system . Rather, it is a transition phase 

, where both competition and coexistence are running parallel . However, its rules and stability are not yet clear . The conclusion is that future power will not remain permanently in the hands of any one country . It will be concentrated in the hands of those countries that can control the chokepoints of the economy, technology, energy, and financial systems .

Therefore, political and strategic distrust is growing around the world . The struggle between different governance systems and development models and the politics of chokepoint control are intensifying. The international system is uncertain and unstable. The Ukraine war, tensions in the Middle East, growing competition in the Indo-Pacific region, and trade wars are the results of this transition. These events are not just regional conflicts, but different forms of struggle to determine the direction of the world order.

Although the world order externally looks like open competition and free markets, its internal structure is deeply entrenched in unequal power distribution, complex interdependence, and ongoing ‘invisible struggles’.

Therefore, the future of the world power system is neither stable in full coexistence nor in full confrontation. This is a dynamic and uncertain transition period, where both competition and coexistence exist together. Therefore, the real challenge is not to stop competition, but to manage it and make coexistence sustainable. This balance will determine the world order of the coming decades.

Another important aspect of this structure is social and economic inequality. As global capital is concentrated in a few centers, many countries and societies are becoming weaker. This inequality increases social instability, political polarization, and migration pressures. Weak states are likely to become weak chokepoints, which can be easily influenced and controlled by external forces. This transition is extremely sensitive for a country like Nepal – Nepal is in a sensitive location not only geographically, but also strategically.