The demand for a directly elected executive in Nepal has been repeatedly raised in recent years.

Against the backdrop of changing governments, growing disillusionment with political parties, and a sense of slow development, many present this model as a ‘measure for stability and effectiveness’. However, any system of governance should not be evaluated based on sentiment, but on the basis of the structure of society, political culture, and historical experience.

Nepal’s state is not yet fully institutionalized. In a society where relationships are more important than rules, access is more important than processes, and power is more important than laws, concentrating power in one person is not a strengthening of the state, but a risk of state capture. A directly elected executive does not produce strong institutions; on the contrary, it casts a shadow of a strong person over a weak institution. History has shown that where institutions are weak, the power of an individual is not democratic.

The weakness of constitutional culture is another decisive reason. Although Nepal’s constitution is progressive on paper, in practice it is caught up in a game of political bargaining and interpretation. The directly elected executive carries the risk of considering itself a representative of public opinion above the constitution. In this situation, it is easy to portray constitutional control as an obstacle, criticism as instability, and voices of dissent as an insult to the mandate. Democracy is born from this.

Political competition in Nepal is not yet ideological. Elections are won by personality, identity, emotional appeal and symbols rather than policies, philosophy and programs. The election of directly elected executives is the extreme form of this trend. It brings popular, aggressive and propaganda-oriented individuals to the center of power rather than qualified and responsible leadership. Governance is limited to performance, not policy.

Its incompatibility with the federal structure is an even deeper problem. Federalism is a philosophy of power sharing, while the directly elected executive is a practice of power centralization. In practice, the executive with a direct mandate tries to control the provincial and local governments by accusing them of obstruction, incompetence or corruption. Thus, federalism remains on paper, but becomes politically ineffective. Nepal's social diversity, historical exclusion and identity struggles are not conducive to the direct executive. Majority decisions are not always fair. The directly elected executive makes the sentiment of the majority the direction of the state, which further distances minorities, marginalised and vulnerable communities from policy making.

Democracy degenerates into majority rule where it should be an exercise in inclusive representation. In a context where Nepal's social structure is sensitive on the basis of caste, region, language and identity, such a system is more likely to produce a 'narrow majority leader' than a 'leadership that everyone accepts'. It has the potential to reduce trust in the state, increase feelings of exclusion and ultimately deepen social tensions. The fact that democracy is not just a process of winning elections, it is also a system of governance based on inclusion and consensus may be overlooked here.

Another serious risk is the closure of political discontent. In a parliamentary system, government change is an institutional process. That possibility is limited to the direct executive. Dissatisfaction is expressed not in parliament, but in the streets. Nepal is a country built on movement, rebellion and street politics. In such a society, keeping power in one place for a long time is not only stability, but also preparation for an explosion.

This means that this model is also politically inappropriate. Direct elections are extremely expensive. Money, media and organizational capacity become decisive. As a result, the executive becomes indebted to capital and influential networks, not the people. Policymaking is based on the calculation of return on investment rather than the public interest. This deepens economic inequality. The risk of populism is high. The directly elected executive prioritizes easy and emotional decisions over difficult but necessary decisions. Long-term reforms, structural changes, and unpopular but necessary policies fall behind. Governance is limited to ‘doing what is visible’, not ‘doing what is right’.

The risk of increasing pressure on constitutional bodies and the judiciary is equally serious. Under the guise of a mandate, the executive may portray constitutional control as an obstacle. Courts, commissions, and regulatory bodies are forced to work in the shadow of a popular executive. Similarly, a directly elected prime minister may tend to ignore parliament in the name of a mandate rather than being accountable to parliament. The weakening role of the legislature is a dangerous sign for democracy. If the prime minister exercises sole control over policy, budget, and administrative decisions, parliament may be limited to a mere formal approval body. This weakens the basic democratic principle of separation of powers.

It weakens the principle of balance of power in practice. It also negatively affects the educational role of democracy. Citizens begin to understand politics through personality, style, and image rather than institutions, policies, and debate. Politics becomes a spectator game, not a participatory exercise. Long-term democratic consciousness is weakened.

Ultimately, the debate over directly elected executives is based on a deep misconception. There is a misconception that changing the system will solve structural problems. Nepal's problem is not the system, but the lack of democratic culture, institutional discipline, and control over power. Changing the system without these reforms will make democracy even more fragile.